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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to determine how to create more equal public 
policy outcomes within the realm of public education.  It is a well known fact that 
despite the passage of legal decisions such as Brown (1954) and federal policies like No 
Child Left Behind (2001), Latino and African American students still perform at lower 
rates than Anglo students.  This poor academic performance results in lower graduation 
rates, lower college attendance, and a lower socioeconomic status than Anglos.   
This dissertation therefore sought to determine if two common bureaucratic 
theories, representative bureaucracy and personnel stability, could be used in 
combination with one another in order to improve the educational policy outcomes for 
African American and Latino students.  Using data from Texas school districts from 
1994-2010 and a cross-sectional longitudinal research design, I find that while each 
theory on its own improved the outcomes for these groups, the two did not have a 
significant combined effect on every indicator.  Instead I find evidence of a substitution 
effect which allows one strategy to be used in place of the other in order to improve the 
academic performance of minority students.  This creates a unique situation as this 
analysis suggests that there are other bureaucratic factors working to prevent an 
interactive effect from occurring on a consistent basis.  Thus the next steps are to apply 
the same theories to other public organizations in order to determine if my findings are 
unique to public education and to determine if other public administration theories can 
be used to improve the outcomes for African American and Latino students. 
 iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my friends and family. 
 
 
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank numerous individuals who have helped me during this 
process.  First I would like to thank my parents, Talmadge and Elizabeth Morton.  They 
have provided me with so much support throughout graduate school.  I would not have 
made it to this point without their encouragement.  From the late night calls to the 
endless practice presentations they were forced to listen to, they have always been there 
for me.  I am truly blessed to be their daughter. 
I would also like to thank my sister, Talitha E. Morton.  She was always willing 
to take a moment out of her day to listen to me vent or simply offer a kind word.  I 
would also like to thank my closest friends who like my sister, convinced me to never 
give up on my dream.  As much as I complained about the woes of graduate school, they 
never told me to shut up, but simply offered a shoulder to cry on and a home-cooked 
meal. 
Finally I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Kenneth J. Meier, for his 
guidance and support throughout the course of my graduate school career.   Dr. Meier 
saw potential in me the first time he met me, and he has always believed in me, even 
when I did not believe in myself.  Through all of the ups and downs of not only graduate 
school, but also life, he has been there as not just a mentor, but also as a friend.  His 
support, criticisms, and never-ending questions have made me the scholar that I am 
today.  
. 
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................  ii 
DEDICATION .....................................................................................  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................  iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................  v 
LIST OF FIGURES ..............................................................................  vii 
LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................  ix 
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ..........................................................  1 
CHAPTER II MINORITIES AND POSITIVE OUTCOMES ............  8 
  
 Literature Review .....................................................................  11 
 Theory ......................................................................................  19 
 Data and Methods .....................................................................  26 
 Findings ....................................................................................  31 
 Discussion ................................................................................  47 
 Conclusion ................................................................................  49 
CHAPTER III MINORITIES AND POLICY TOOLS ........................  53 
  
 Literature Review .....................................................................  56 
 Theory ......................................................................................  63 
 Data and Methods .....................................................................  71 
 Findings ....................................................................................  74 
 Discussion ................................................................................  103 
 Conclusion ................................................................................  107 
CHAPTER IV MAGNITUDE OF EFFECTS .....................................  109 
  
 TAKS .......................................................................................  109 
 ISS ............................................................................................  113 
 OSS ...........................................................................................  116 
 Expulsions ................................................................................  119 
 vi 
 
 Conclusions ..............................................................................  121 
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION .............................................................  122 
REFERENCES .....................................................................................  132 
APPENDIX A ......................................................................................  141 
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................  149 
 
 vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE Page 
 1  The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black 
   Performance .....................................................................   34 
  
 2 The Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability on Black 
  Performance ......................................................................   35 
 
 3  The Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability on Latino 
  Performance ......................................................................   39 
 
 4 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino 
  Performance ......................................................................   40 
 
 5 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black 
  Expulsions .........................................................................   78 
  
 6 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino 
  Expulsions .........................................................................   79 
 
 7 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black 
  Expulsions .........................................................................   82 
 
 8 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino 
  Expulsions .........................................................................   83 
 
 9 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black 
  OSS ...................................................................................   89 
 
 10 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino 
  OSS ...................................................................................   90 
 
 11 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black 
  OSS ...................................................................................   93 
 
 12 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino 
  OSS ...................................................................................   94 
 
 13  The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black 
  ISS .....................................................................................   98 
 viii 
 
  
  
 14 The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino 
  ISS .....................................................................................   99 
 
 15 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black 
  ISS .....................................................................................   102 
 
 16 The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino 
  ISS .....................................................................................   103   
 ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE Page 
 1 Theoretical Expectations...................................................   26 
 
 2 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Black Performance ........................................   32 
 
 3 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Latino Performance .......................................   37 
 
 4 Theoretical Expectations for Policy Tools........................   71 
 
 5  The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Black Expulsions ...........................................   75 
 
 6 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Latino Expulsions ..........................................     76 
 
 7 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Black OSS .....................................................   86 
 
 8 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Latino OSS ....................................................   87 
 
 9  The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Black ISS .......................................................   95 
 
 10 The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel 
  Stability on Latino ISS ......................................................   96 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
In the United States we pride ourselves on being a nation based on equality.  
Equal rights, equal access to government services, equal chances to achieve the 
American Dream.  We protest against those in other countries who we believe are not 
treating their citizens equally.  In some cases we even resort to violence, all in the name 
of equality.  In the midst of everything, we should ask exactly how equal are we?  
Despite the dramatic changes that have occurred, we still live in a very unequal nation.  
While examples of inequality can be seen in many cases, one of the most visible and 
disturbing is the inequality in public policy outcomes (Wilson 2012).  The United States 
still does not provide equal public policy outcomes for minorities in a variety of policy 
areas, such as housing, healthcare, and education (Orfield 2004; LaVeist and Isaac 2012; 
Wilson 2012).  While all of these areas are important, this dissertation will focus on 
public education.   
Public education is one of the most important services the government can 
provide.  It provides the education and reading/comprehension skills needed for 
individuals to enter the workforce, attend college, participate in the political process, and 
even order off of a menu.  Given the importance of this service one would assume that it 
would be provided in an equal fashion to all individuals.  Historically, however this has 
not been the case for minorities as there have been many unequal practices that have lead 
to large differences in academic achievement between minorities and whites (Coleman, 
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Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfield, and York 1966; Jones 1984; National 
Center For Educational Statistics 1995; Jencks and Phillips 1998).  
One such practice was a more discreet form of segregation called second-
generation discrimination that occurred right after the Brown (1954) decision (Meier, 
Stewart, and England 1989).  This type of discrimination was not as visible as the 
previous “separate but equal” discrimination that occurred during Jim Crow, but it had 
the same effect on minority education.  Second-generation discrimination consisted of 
the use of policies that on their face looked equal, but in reality resulted in racial 
segregation within the school (Meier et al 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991).  Minority 
students were punished and placed in special education classes at higher rates in order to 
separate them from white students who were often placed in gifted classes (Meier et al 
1989; Meier and Stewart 1991).  The result was an unequal education which had long 
term effects such as lower graduation rates, lower college attendance, fewer life chances, 
and a lower socioeconomic status for Black and Latino students (Cohen and Tyree 
1986).  This achievement gap as it would come to be called was first noted in the 
Coleman Report during the 1960s and was studied intensely for the next few decades 
(Coleman et al 1966).  Some progress was made in the 1970s and 1980s as there were 
some small decreases in the differences between minority and white NAEP (National 
Assessment of Educational Progress) test scores (Campbell, Hombo, and Mazzeo 2000; 
Loveless and Diperna, 2000).  However, this gap began to widen again in the 1990s as 
the performance of Black and Latino students leveled off and white students, once again, 
began making significant gains (Lee 2002).  This achievement gap resulted in the 
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continuation of the same negative socioeconomic consequences seen in the previous 
decades. 
Despite the knowledge of these inequalities and their roots, similar educational 
disparities can still be seen today.  Black and Latino students continue to perform at rates 
lower than Anglos.  For example the NAEP’s 2008 longitudinal study found that for 17 
year old high school students there were no significant changes in the gap between Black 
students and white students (nationsreportcard.gov 2008).  Thus the score gap remained 
at 26 points, which is equal to the same gap that occurred in 1992.  There was also no 
significant change in the Latino-white achievement gap since 2004.  The 21 point gap 
was the exact same size as the 1996 gap between these students (nationsreportcard.gov 
2008).   
During this same time period we see that, despite governmental efforts, 
minorities continued to have higher rates of poverty as well as lower incomes than 
Anglos (Johnson 2006; Oliver and Shapiro 2006).  The lower socioeconomic status of 
minorities often resulted in their inability to move out of poor neighborhoods, which 
effectively recreated racially and economically segregated school districts.  Considering 
the fact that the financial resources that fund the district come from the individuals living 
within it, scholars find that minority students were, and still are more likely to reside in 
districts with less wealth and fewer educational resources (Johnson 2006).  This poses a 
major problem since increased access to resources is linked to improved academic 
performance (Wenglinsky 1997).  Given the well established link between education and 
economic outcomes, the low academic performance of minority students (relative to 
 4 
 
whites) often prevents minorities from achieving a significantly higher income level than 
their parents (Johnson 2006; Oliver and Shapiro 2006).  In the end what we see is a 
vicious cycle of poverty/poor school district/poor performance that perpetuates the same 
educational inequalities seen in the 1960s despite the passage of new public policies, 
such as the No Child Left Behind Act (2001) which was supposed to effectively reduce 
the achievement gap and improve the performance of minority students. 
While we can discuss the statistics associated with the achievement gap all day 
long, there is a more important discussion to be held.  It begins with the question: How 
do we determine what needs to be changed in order to improve the educational outcomes 
for Black and Latino students?  I argue that the public management literature holds the 
key for indentifying what inequalities exist and how public managers, such as 
superintendents, can change strategies in order to eliminate these inequalities.  After all 
public management’s ultimate goal is to determine how managers within public 
organizations can improve the agency’s performance, and therefore provide public 
services in an efficient, equal, and effective way (Light 1999).   
Using this line of thought one can make the argument for the usage of this 
literature for public education.  School districts are large, complex public organizations.  
They have levels of employees, each with a role dedicated to achieving the end goal of 
providing a quality education to every student.  Teachers are street-level bureaucrats 
responsible for implementing the federal/state/district policies aimed at education 
students.  Principals and superintendents are organizational managers who work hard to 
implement procedures and strategies that will aid their teachers in providing a quality 
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education.  Finally students are individuals seeking out a public service in order to 
improve their life chances.  Given these characteristics, using the public management 
literature as a way to improve public education makes perfect sense.  This is even truer 
when we consider the public education research of other public management scholars. 
For decades scholars have hypothesized how the public management ideals of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and equality can affect the quality of public education service 
delivery.  They have attempted to link many organizational factors such as 
organizational structure, bureaucratic competency, stability, and managerial strategies to 
the performance of school districts (Pitkin 1967; Mosher 1968; Wilson 1989; Light 
1999).  Over time some of these theories have demonstrated ways that not only improve 
organizational performance, but also create more equal policy outcomes for clients 
(Light 1999).  For example Meier et al (1989) and Meier and Stewart (1991) linked 
passive representation within the school to reductions in second generation 
discrimination.  Reductions in this type of discrimination improve the likelihood that 
minority students will experience higher academic performance. Years later Dee (2005) 
was able to make a similar link, therefore giving credibility to the theory of 
representative bureaucracy as one way to improve the academic outcomes for minorities. 
Scholars have also made links between managerial quality, managerial networking, 
organizational resources and structure, and more to education (O’Toole and Meier 2004; 
Goerdel 2006; Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier 2008).  The end results of these studies have 
been not only ways to improve the academic performance of minority students, but also 
recommendations that can benefit public organizations in general. 
 6 
 
This dissertation follows in this line of research as its ultimate goal is to not only 
determine how to reduce the achievement gap and improve minority performance, but 
also determine how we can use two popular public management strategies as the way to 
do this.  Like the previous research, this dissertation also serves a larger goal of 
discovering how to improve policy outcomes in a host of policy arenas.  The two 
theories examined are the theory of representative bureaucracy and the theory of 
personnel stability.  Each has been shown, through empirical support, as a way in which 
to improve organizational performance, and in some instances academic performance 
(Dunn 1997; Light 1999; O’Toole and Meier 2003; Dee 2005; Roch et al 2010).  In most 
studies these two strategies are treated as the main independent variable.  Demographic 
traits, longevity, and experience are often included in the models as control variables, 
but a close examination of the literature does not show any studies in which the two are 
interacted and examined for mitigating relationships.  Consequently in this analysis I 
attempt to do exactly that.           
More specifically I attempt to better understand the role of personnel stability1 in 
relation to passive representation2, as well as passive representation in relation to 
personnel stability.  While policy recommendations can be made based on the 
conclusions of a personnel stability study, they still may not lead to the best outcomes 
for minority students.  A stable organization is often comprised of individuals from 
                                                 
1 In this study personnel stability refers to the changes in organizational personnel (Light 1999).  It is 
measured as the percent of bureaucrats (teachers in this case) that return from the previous year to the 
organization. 
2 Passive representation refers to the demographic traits of bureaucrats, such as race, religion, and gender, 
and how they come to affect the policy outcomes and outputs of clients sharing these demographic traits 
(Wilkins and Keiser 2006). 
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various racial backgrounds that may or may not resemble the organization’s clientele. 
Likewise a representative organization may have individuals with varying years of 
experience within the organization.  These two traits, stability and representation, 
therefore are not mutually exclusive, but instead interactive.  It is quite possible that 
when two are interacted we may see 1) no effect 2) a greater effect 3) a sign change from 
+ to – or vice versa.  Thus it is in the best interest of not only the clients who will be 
experiencing the outcomes related to the management strategy used, but also the public 
manager choosing the strategy to understand the range of effects related to the various 
combinations of these two theories.  
Regardless of what this study does or does not find, it still serves a benefit to the 
public management discipline as well as education.  If the two theories of personnel 
stability and representative bureaucracy can interact in such a way that they can improve 
the performance of minority students beyond the usual gains seen with just one strategy, 
then an argument can be made for an interactive relationship.  If the theories fail to work 
as mitigating strategies, then we have the opportunity to create new hypotheses as to 
why they work individually but not together.  Furthermore any findings or non-findings 
within the educational arena will help to answer the question as to why minority 
academic performance has yet to reach parity with that of Anglos over the past two 
decades.  Any conclusions drawn must be tested with other data from other public 
agencies in order to determine its generalizability. Thus while this theoretical argument 
is limited to education, it has the potential to be applied to many different organizations 
and levels of personnel, therefore making it a springboard for other studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
MINORITIES AND POSITIVE OUTCOMES 
Most scholars believe that public organizations should be effective, efficient, and 
responsive.  There is however, no consensus as to how agencies will come to embody 
these qualities, and thus fulfill the bureaucracy’s goal of successful policy 
implementation (Mosher 1968).  When we consider the diversity of an agency’s 
clientele, the bureaucrats working within these organizations, and the different policy 
goals, it is no surprise that scholars have yet to create a general theory as to how 
agencies can improve their responsiveness to best meet the policy needs of their clients.  
Despite these major obstacles however, empirical research has been able to validate two 
strategies. 
  One management theory/strategy that has found support is the theory of 
representative bureaucracy.  This theory argues that agencies that match the 
demographic of their clientele are more responsive to the needs of these individuals, and 
as a result, are able to achieve public policy goals more effectively and efficiently than 
are organizations that are more homogenous in nature (Selden 1997).   Implicit in this 
theory is the idea that the more representative a bureaucracy is, the better it will be at 
identifying the needs of each group comprising the organization’s clientele.  The 
identification of such interests subsequently allows the organization to better respond to 
the needs of those groups that are often underrepresented and negatively impacted by 
public policies, such as minorities (Lim 2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  
Given the increasingly diverse society in which we live in, as well as the continuation of 
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racial disparities in certain policy outcomes, this theory continues to be advocated by 
scholars as one way in which to improve organizational responsiveness to minority 
clients. 
On the other hand, another strategy that has found empirical support comes from 
the stability literature.  This theory contends that personnel stability can lead to better 
policy outcomes because bureaucrats who have worked in the same agency for an 
extended period of time have the opportunity to develop a specialized skill set that 
allows them to efficiently and effectively meet the needs of their specific clientele (Dunn 
1997; Light 1999; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  In addition, this theory argues that while 
employee turnover may bring new ideas and perspectives to an organization, it can also 
generate or exacerbate problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, therefore decreasing 
performance and responsiveness (Light 1999).  As a result, some scholars contend that 
the key to improved performance and achieving policy goals lies in an organization’s 
ability to maintain a stable workforce (O’Toole and Meier 2003). 
While both of these theories have been supported through empirical research, it is 
evident that the representative bureaucracy literature often overlooks the significance of 
personnel stability, while the stability literature rarely mentions the importance of 
passive representation.  Thus this study seeks to examine the interactive relationship 
between these two concepts.  My goal is to determine how to best improve 
organizational responsiveness and performance in order to achieve better policy results 
for minorities.  Therefore this analysis begins to answer the broad question: What are the 
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combined effects of the management strategies of personnel stability and representative 
bureaucracy on minority public policy outcomes?   
Given the magnitude of this question, this paper focuses on two specific 
questions: Does street-level personnel stability mitigate the negative effects of a lack of 
passive representation for minority clients?  Can passive bureaucratic representation 
mitigate the negative effects of bureaucratic instability for minority clients?  In order to 
answer these questions, I use public school districts as a proxy for public organizations 
since they are highly decentralized organizations that rely on street-level bureaucrats’ 
discretion and responsiveness in order to achieve state/federal policy goals (O’Toole and 
Meier 2003; Goerdel 2006; Rocha 2006).  In addition there is much variation within the 
demographics of the teaching and student populations, as well as the personnel stability 
of each district.  Thus both strategies are likely to be employed by the managers and 
bureaucrats within these organizations (Selden 1997; Dee 2004; Dee 2005).   
 In this initial study I do not find evidence of mitigating relationships.  Thus the 
preliminary testing of my hypotheses in public schools allows me to determine that 
passive representation does not moderate the negative effects that teacher instability 
often has on the academic performance of minority students (Meier and O’Toole 2003).  
Instead I find evidence that these two strategies are substitutes for one another. In 
addition I find support for my hypothesis that a lack of both personnel stability and 
representation can severely decrease the performance of minority students.   
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Literature Review 
Representative Bureaucracy  
The theory of representative bureaucracy’s primary focus is “how the 
demographic characteristics of bureaucrats affect the distribution of outputs to clients 
who share these demographic characteristics” (Wilkins and Keiser 2006, 87).  In this 
theory two forms of representation are identified: passive and active (Pitkin 1967).  
Passive representation occurs when the individuals within the bureaucracy share the 
same demographic characteristics (race, gender, etc) as their clients.  Active 
representation occurs when bureaucrats who have discretion use it to advocate for the 
interests of a particular group of clients in order to diminish or eradicate the 
discrimination that has disproportionately affected this group (Mosher 1982; Hindera 
1993).  Passive representation leads to active representation when two conditions are 
met.  First and foremost the policy must be one in which the bureaucrats have substantial 
discretion.  Secondly it must be a policy area that is relevant to the demographic trait in 
question (Meier 1993a; Wilkins and Keiser 2006).  
Based on these conditions, scholars often examine the impact that minority and 
female bureaucrats have on the policy outcomes for minority and female clients in public 
education, since this is a policy arena in which bureaucrats have considerable discretion, 
as well as one that has historically had negative impacts for these groups (Keiser, 
Wilkins, Meier, and Holland 2002; Dee 2004; Wilkins and Keiser 2006).  In one 
analysis, scholars found that Black teachers are associated with increases in Black 
student performance (Meier, Doerfler, Hawes, Hicklin, and Rocha 2006).  Rocha (2007) 
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for example, also found that Latino teachers are associated with increases in Latino 
student performance on one of the most visible indicators of student performance.  
Keiser et al (2002) found that with an increase in the passive representation of women in 
the form of female math teachers, girls tended to have higher math scores.  Thus the 
literature has some support for the theory of representative bureaucracy in that minority 
and female clients often experience more positive policy outcomes with the presence of 
passive representation.   
Implicit in these studies of representative bureaucracy is the idea that non-
minority bureaucrats are not associated with positive policy outcomes for minorities 
(Meier 1993b; Selden 1997; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  For example, Meier et 
al (1989) find that low levels of Black representation are associated with increases in the 
rates at which Black students were punished and tracked into lower level and special 
education classes.  Meier and Stewart (1991) also find that low levels of Latino 
representation are associated with increases in the rates at which Latino students were 
punished and tracked into lower level and special education classes.  Dee (2005) also 
finds the non-co-ethnic teachers are more likely to view non-co-ethnic students as 
disruptive, troubled, and unintelligent than are same-race teachers.  The conclusion 
drawn therefore is that without the presence of minority bureaucrats to change, or re-
socialize, the values and beliefs of non-minority bureaucrats, non-minority bureaucrats 
will be unable to “reduce ignorance and rejection; [in order to] increase bureaucratic 
understanding of minority views and feelings” (Krantz 1974, 435; see also Lim 2006).  
Thus the most common conclusion drawn from the theory of representative bureaucracy 
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is that a lack of passive representation prevents minorities from experiencing the most 
beneficial policy outcomes.  
Stability, Responsiveness, and Performance 
In the public management literature scholars have identified five different forms 
of stability: structural, mission, production/technology, procedural, and personnel 
(Allison 1971; Wilson 1989; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  While there is research on how 
all five forms affect responsiveness and policy outcomes, the focus of this initial study is 
personnel stability3 given that these are the individuals (top-level managers and street-
level bureaucrats) responsible for implementing and tailoring broad federal/state policies 
to their clienteles’ needs, and thus directly affect client outcomes (Selden 1997; Keiser et 
al 2002; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  It is considered important, because while employee 
turnover can create positive changes in the form of new perspectives and ideas, it can 
also generate or exaggerate problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness within the 
agency (Light 1999).  
Research has shown that even though scholars advocate for organizational 
change and the recruitment of new individuals as ways in which to improve 
responsiveness and policy outcomes, high turnover amongst street-level bureaucrats can 
exacerbate “the difficulties involved in building competence, mutual trust, and long-term 
commitment” (O’Toole and Meier 2011, 137; see also Barzelay and Armajani 1992; 
Dunn 1997).  They find that street-level bureaucrats especially benefit from personnel 
stability due to the constraints, workloads, and general unpredictable nature of the 
                                                 
3 As a concept personnel stability refers to the changes in organizational personnel over time (Light 1999).   
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relationships that they have with clients (Lipsky 1980; Meier and O’Toole 2007).  The 
longer bureaucrats are employed in these organizations the more easily, and more 
effectively, they can deliver services and programs to clients in their particular 
jurisdiction due to the development of specialized skills and routines.  Since bureaucrats 
develop these skills in response to their environment, they are better able to deal with 
certain cases than are other street-level bureaucrats who lack experience with this 
particular clientele.  Since this skill set is so specialized however, it often does not 
transfer from organization to organization, further making street-level bureaucrat 
stability important to managers if they seek to accomplish the policy goals of their 
agency in an efficient and effective manner (O’Toole and Meier 2003).    
The importance of personnel stability is even more visible when we consider the 
role of burnout-generated turnover within public organizations, and especially public 
education (Golembiewski 1990; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  For years school 
administrators and scholars have been concerned with the shortage of teachers as fewer 
individuals are entering the education field and fewer are making it a life-long career 
(Ingersoll 2003).  Instead teachers, like many other bureaucrats are now entering the 
public sector with higher/broader-ranging degrees that give them the opportunity to 
leave their organization in order to work in the private and/or non-profit sectors, as well 
as in other public organizations (Ingersoll 2003).  Since teachers are more likely to leave 
public schools with high proportions of low income, poor performing, and minority 
students in order to take jobs in higher performing/wealthier districts, the impact of 
personnel instability on minority performance can be great (Shen 1997; Carroll, 
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Reichardt, and Guarino 2000; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2002; Loeb, Darling-
Hammond, and Luczak 2005).   
Given the potential mobility of teachers, scholars have examined the effects that 
personnel instability rather than just inexperience has on student performance.  Stability 
has been directly linked to performance because high teacher turnover means that a 
district must constantly hire new teachers in order to replace the teachers who are 
leaving (O’Toole and Meier 2003).  These new teachers are often not as effective as 
those who have been in the district longer because they must learn (often through trial 
and error) what combination of skills and methods will work best for their particular 
classroom, as well as how to implement the theories they learned in school into actual 
working strategies, and deal with the daily distractions that can hinder their ability to 
teach (O’Toole and Meier 2003).  Consequently these studies have found that lower-
level personnel stability was positively and significantly related to student performance 
(O’Toole and Meier 2003, 54).   
Likewise, Loeb et al. (2005) find that turnover introduces new challenges to the 
district such as a “lack of continuity in instruction, lack of adequate teaching expertise 
for making curriculum decisions and providing support and mentoring, and lost time and 
resources for replacement and training” (44).  These issues negatively affect student 
performance by preventing teachers from having the expertise needed to implement 
policy decisions made by managers and school board members, as well as by diverting 
funds from other areas into the continuous recruiting, hiring, and training of teachers 
who may leave after only a few years (Sanders and Rivers 1996; Darling-Hammond 
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2003).  Therefore, with the presence of lower-level personnel instability, a public 
organization is less likely to accomplish its mission and policy goals, which in the 
school’s case is to provide a quality and equal education to all students.  
Missing Relationship in the Literature 
From the literature it is apparent that representative bureaucracy scholars tend to 
attribute increases in responsiveness and policy benefits mainly to demographic traits.  
This is evident in their heavy emphasis on only demographic characteristics in their two 
explanatory concepts of demand inducement (the idea that the presence of minorities 
within the bureaucracy will increase the demand for services from minority clients) and 
coproduction inducement (the idea that minority bureaucrats can better motivate 
minorities to make the behavioral changes needed to improve the outcomes they receive 
from public programs) (Selden 1997; Wilkins and Keiser 2001; Keiser et al 2002; Lim 
2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).   
 While these studies support the theory of representative bureaucracy in that they 
demonstrate that passive representation can lead to better policy outcomes for minorities, 
they do not examine the potential mitigating effects that street-level stability can have 
for minority clients in unrepresentative bureaucracies.  The fact that management 
scholars have found that stability can improve the responsiveness of street-level 
bureaucrats to their clientele suggests that representative bureaucracy scholars, by not 
considering personnel stability’s effects on performance and policy outcomes, have 
overlooked an integral component of organizational responsiveness.  I believe that 
before we make claims that only Black bureaucrats can lead to more beneficial outcomes 
 17 
 
for Black clients, and thus we can improve the policy outcomes for Blacks by simply 
hiring more Blacks, we must be sure that a stable, non-representative bureaucracy that 
has had time to develop a specialized skill set to respond to the unique needs of Blacks 
does not have the same positive effects.  This is especially important when we consider 
the ever-growing scarcity of Black bureaucrats in public organizations, such as schools 
(Irvine 1989).  If minorities are already underrepresented within the public organization 
that can have the most dramatic impact on their lives, simply hiring more minorities, as 
suggested by the theory of representative bureaucracy, is not a realistic management 
strategy.  This strategy is even less practical when we consider that the amount of Black 
teachers continues to decrease, despite efforts by universities and special interest groups 
to recruit these individuals into the profession.   
I also argue that before we make claims that only Latino bureaucrats can lead to 
more beneficial outcomes for Latino clients, and thus we can improve the policy 
outcomes for Latinos by simply hiring more Latinos, we must be sure that a stable, non-
representative bureaucracy that has had time to develop a specialized skill set to respond 
to the unique needs of Latinos does not have the same positive policy outcomes. This is 
especially true when we consider that despite the increase in Latino teachers in Texas in 
the last ten years, Latinos continue to perform at lower rates that Anglos (Loveless and 
Diperna 2000; NEAP 2000). 
Likewise, we must consider the differences in outcomes that passive 
representation can have on client outcomes given an unstable staff.  Consider an area, 
such as Texas, that has a large Latino population.  It has been well documented that 
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while the U.S. considers any person with origins from a Spanish-speaking country a 
“Latino,” this group is far from homogeneous (U.S Census 2000; Garcia-Bedolla 2009).  
A Guatemalan child who immigrated to the U.S. at the age of twelve and a fourth 
generation twelve year old Mexican-American student are going to have drastically 
different backgrounds, cultural values, socioeconomic statuses, and English language 
comprehension skills (Garcia-Bedolla 2009).  Thus these two students will need 
different teaching techniques, programs, and amounts of specialized attention in order to 
experience positive educational policy outcomes (high academic achievement).  It is 
quite possible that an unstable and representative teaching force can recognize the 
specific needs of these students given their shared life experiences and culture, while an 
unstable and unrepresentative teaching force may not (Hakuta 1998; Gonzalez and 
Darling-Hammond 2000).  Therefore, I expect these two organizations, despite both 
being unstable, to result in different academic outcomes for Latino students.  
Therefore, if we seek to achieve the goals of policies like No Child Left Behind 
(2001) and eliminate the racial disparities that remain in public education today, we must 
consider how certain public management strategies interact with one another (Campbell, 
Hombo, and Mazzeo 2000; Loveless and Diperna 2000).  Given the potentially 
mitigating roles that these strategies may play, the next section attempts to consolidate 
both of these theories into a more cohesive theory in order to determine what type of 
public organization can provide the best possible policy outcomes for minority groups.  
Thus the following theory and hypotheses attempt to determine which combination of 
 19 
 
public management strategies can eliminate the racial disparities that remain in public 
education that continue today (Campbell et al 2000; Loveless and Diperna 2000). 
Theory  
As mentioned before the purpose of this analysis is to examine the potentially 
mitigating effects of passive representation and personnel stability in order to determine 
how to improve organizational responsiveness and policy outcomes for minority clients.  
This study specifically examines this relationship within the school system since the 
internal structure of these public organizations makes them ideal for testing both theories 
simultaneously.  For example, even though teachers operate under the basic state and 
district curricula, they are allowed great discretion in the ways in which they choose to 
implement these policies through their choice of teaching methods, incentives/deterrents, 
and interpersonal interactions (Roch, Pitts, and Navarro 2010).  As a result, this freedom 
in policy implementation allows these street-level bureaucrats to directly influence the 
policy outcomes for minority clients.  The large amount of discretion awarded to 
teachers combined with the well known Black-white and Latino-white achievement gap 
satisfies both theoretical conditions needed for representative bureaucracy (discretion 
and a policy area salient to a particular group) to be considered as a realistic 
management strategy, as well as for passive representation to lead to the active 
representation of minority interests (Selden 1997; Campbell et al 2000; Loveless and 
Diperna 2000). 
 Schools also satisfy the basic requirements for personnel stability to be 
considered as a feasible management strategy since the majority of the educational 
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policy implementation is done by street-level bureaucrats, who have the opportunity to 
create specialized skill sets and procedures in order to achieve the district’s mission of 
providing a quality education.  Moreover, the benefits of teacher stability on overall 
student achievement (though not disaggregated by race) have already been documented 
in the education literature, as scholars find that if new or inexperienced teachers have 
any concerns in implementing district/state-wide education policies they often turn to a 
senior teacher for guidance (Nettle 1998; Kauffman, Johnson, Kardos, Liu, and Peske 
2002).  This occurs because teacher stability allows for more frequent interactions with 
students, and therefore more knowledge about the students’ specific needs and how to 
implement policies in ways that ensure that students perform well.  In cases such as 
these, studies demonstrate that a stable teacher workforce can successfully improve 
students’ academic performance (better policy outcomes) (O’Toole and Meier 2003). 
Given the decentralized structure of public schools (and other similarly 
structured public organizations), I argue that the combination of personnel stability and 
passive representation should lead to beneficial policy outcomes for minority students 
since these organizations should be the most responsive to these clients.  Conversely, 
those organizations that lack street-level bureaucrat stability and passive representation 
should have negative policy outcomes for minority clients since they should be the least 
responsive.  While both of these arguments fall in line with the literature, what will be 
the most interesting will be the outcomes when I examine unstable and passively 
representative organizations and stable organizations that lack passive representation.  In 
these cases, I expect the benefits of stability to mitigate the negative effects often 
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associated with an unrepresentative bureaucracy, as well as passive representative to 
moderate the negative effects of instability.  Therefore, I propose that these two different 
organizations should provide similar policy benefits for Black clients.  In order to better 
illustrate my expectations, I have created a specific hypothesis for each type of 
organization. 
H1: Stable and passively represented public organizations will lead to positive policy 
outcomes for minority students. 
I believe that as organizations become more passively representative and stable 
they should result in positive policy outcomes for minority students.  In these districts I 
expect that, in accordance with the theory of representative bureaucracy, passive 
representation, in the form of minority teachers, should lead to the active representation 
of minority students’ interests, because their shared life experiences should lead to 
minority bureaucrats holding similar values and beliefs as their minority clients (Selden 
1997).   These similar interests, when combined with the great discretion in education 
policy granted to street-level bureaucrats (teachers) in public schools, should lead to the 
same positive policy outcomes for minority students that other scholars have found 
(Meier 1993b; Dee 2004; Dee 2005).  
However given that no population is completely homogenous, it cannot be 
assumed that all minorities have had the same life experiences and interests.  Differences 
in class, education, country of origin, generational status, bilingualism, and other 
variables also play a critical role in how one exercises his/her discretion and 
consequently, how students perform (Welch and Foster 1987; Garcia-Bedolla 2009).  
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This is where I believe stability will become an important factor.  As a minority teacher 
interacts with the same stable workforce and same-race clientele, he/she should 
eventually develop specialized skills and routines that can help them address not only the 
clientele’s unique race-based interests, but also those tied to other social, economic, and 
environmental factors.  The combination of passive representation and personnel 
stability therefore, should allow these organizations to effectively and efficiently respond 
to their clients’ needs and lead to positive policy outcomes for minority clients. 
H2: Passively represented, but unstable public organizations will lead to positive policy 
outcomes for minority students. 
I believe that even if organizations become more passively representative and 
more unstable organizations, they will still yield policy benefits to minority students.  
This will occur because even if there is constant teacher turnover and change that 
theoretically should bring about organizational inefficiency and ineffectiveness, the fact 
that these organizations match the demographics of their students, should allow 
bureaucrats to still be responsive to at least the race-specific needs of its minority 
clientele (Lipsky 1980).  Since minority bureaucrats should share at least some of the 
same experiences and interests as their minority clients, they should understand some of 
the cultural, social, and learning differences of minority students before they even enter 
the organization (Pitkin 1967; Foley 1997; Gutierrez and Rogoff 2003).  So even with 
teacher instability, Black and Latino teachers should not need as much time as non-
minority teachers to create a specialized skill set to address their specific race-based 
needs.  Likewise, since same-race teachers tend to view same-race students more 
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positively, they, unlike non-co-ethnic teachers, should not require the same continuous 
interactions with minorities in order to change their initial negative perceptions of these 
students (Dee 2004).  
The benefits of the role-model effect should also play an important role.  
Teaching is an especially well respected profession within the Black community given 
that it was one of the few professions that led to greater social mobility for Blacks in the 
past (Irvine 1989).  It is also seen as a tool for social mobility by Latinos.  Growing up 
with this positive perception of teachers, Blacks and Latinos students may pay more 
attention and work harder in order to gain the approval of these teachers (Dee 2005).  
Thus even if there is constant teacher turnover, simply seeing a co-ethnic person in a 
position of authority should actually encourage same race students to perform better as 
they attempt to meet the expectations of their role models (Dee 2005).  Consequently in 
these organizations, I do not expect the difficulties of personnel instability to completely 
hinder performance, as the passively representative workforce should be able to mitigate 
these effects and continue to provide better positive policy outcomes for Black and 
Latino students.   
H3: Unrepresentative, but stable public organizations will lead to positive policy 
outcomes for minority students. 
 Even as organizations become more passively unrepresentative and stable 
minority clients should still experience positive outcomes.  I argue that in accordance 
with the stability literature, even though these non-minority bureaucrats do not share the 
same life experiences as their Black or Latino clients, increases in personnel stability 
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within the organization should allow for the development of the specialized 
skills/procedures needed to easily identify and respond to the unique needs of their 
clientele (Lipsky 1980).  
Furthermore the daily interaction with minority students and parents in the form 
of teaching, parent-teacher associations, and more generated by stability should re-
socialize non-minority teachers to be more sensitive to the unique cultural and academic 
needs of Black and Latino students much in the same way that the theory of 
representative bureaucracy argues that minority bureaucrats can change the values of 
non-minority bureaucrats (Krantz 1974; Lim 2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  
Non-minority teachers then will be able to tailor broad education policies to their 
specific needs and make responsiveness to minorities the “organizational norm” much in 
the same way that minority teachers would. 
Increased responsiveness to minorities’ interests would also help the district 
achieve their principle policy goal of providing a quality education to all students.  Since 
schools are like other organizations in which achieving organizational goals and meeting 
state/federal standards are extremely important to the survival of the agency, 
responsiveness to client interests should be reinforced through the yearly reviews each 
teacher, department, and district receives (TEA.gov 2010).  Teachers who are aware of 
their clients’ needs and are responsive to their interests should have higher performing 
students and therefore, more positive reviews from principals.  This should reinforce the 
identification and adoption of such values because not only do they work to improve the 
overall performance of the organization, but they also give personal satisfaction in that 
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the differences that these non-minority teachers are making in the lives of their students 
is being recognized by superintendents and principals.  This positive reinforcement is 
especially important for public employees because performance-based financial 
incentives are not always an option, therefore making the personal satisfaction gained 
from being responsive to one’s clients and achieving agency goals even more important 
in maintaining responsiveness to minorities (Lipsky 1980).  Administrators should also 
encourage these teachers to continue to improve their responsiveness to minorities’ 
academic needs because it will lead to higher ranking and more funding for the schools.  
Consequently these organizations should lead to positive policy outcomes for minorities. 
H4: Unrepresentative and unstable public organizations will lead to negative policy 
outcomes for minorities. 
Finally I hypothesize that as organizations become less passive representative, as 
well as are more unstable, minority clients can expect to experience negative policy 
outcomes.  This hypothesis is based on the idea that if there is no passive representation 
of Black or Latino students within the school, there is little chance of the active 
representation of their demographic-specific interests.  In terms of education, these 
teachers will be unaware of minorities’ unique learning needs given that there are 
cultural-based learning differences between students (Foley 1997; Gutierrez and Rogoff 
2003).  The increasing lack of passive representation also decreases the likelihood that 
minority teachers within the organization can re-socialize non-minority bureaucrats to be 
more empathetic to minority students, which should result in these non-minority teachers 
continuing to hold onto stereotypes and negative perceptions of minorities as troubled 
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and unintelligent (Krantz 1974; Dee 2005).  This works to further decrease the 
likelihood that minority students will experience positive academic performance (Dee 
2005). 
  Furthermore, the increasing lack of stability should further prevent these non-
minority teachers from developing the routines and organizational culture in which 
responsiveness to the group’s specific needs is accepted and encouraged.  Since 
instability should prevent non-minority teachers from recognizing even the non-race 
based needs of minority students, bureaucratic responsiveness to any of the groups’ 
interest are highly unlikely to occur, which should result in decreased Black academic 
performance.   
Thus in terms of policy outcomes for minority students are hypothesized to be: 
 
 
 
 Passively Representative Unrepresentative 
Stable Positive Positive 
Unstable Positive Negative 
Table 1. Theoretical Expectations 
 
 
Data and Methods 
In order to model this relationship I used public school data from 1994-2010 
from the Texas Education Agency.  I have specifically chosen Texas because of its great 
variation in race/ethnicity, district sizes, and fiscal/personnel resources.  This allowed 
me to control for the additional variables that can affect academic performance.  In 
addition Texas publicly reports student performance by race for its yearly state-wide 
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standardized test.  This allowed me to determine if passive representation and stability 
have a significant impact on the performance of African-American and Latino students 
above and beyond the traditional factors associated with performance.  Finally, the large 
number of districts4 (more than 1000) combined with the diversity of these districts 
suggests that my findings will be generalizable to other public education systems as well 
as “organizations with similar characteristics (highly professionalized organizations with 
discretion vested in street level bureaucrats)” (Keiser et al 2002, 559; see also Meier and 
O’Toole 2003). 
Stability and Representation 
 In this study teacher stability is defined as the stable year to year employment of 
all teachers.  Therefore I measure my independent variable of teacher stability5 as the 
percent of teachers that return from the prior school year.  I measured the independent 
variable of passive representative as either the percent of Black teachers or Latino 
teachers working in the district.  I examined Blacks and Latinos as separate groups since 
there are cultural and linguistic factors that are unique to each group.  Thus Black 
teachers, despite being minorities, will not have the same effects on Latino students 
because they are not co-ethnics.  To further understand the relationship between 
representation and personnel stability I created the interaction term of teacher 
stability*passive representation.  The use of this interaction in the model allows me to 
                                                 
4 Texas has more than 8% of all school districts in the United States (U.S. Department of Education 2004). 
5 Teacher stability is used instead of teacher experience since the variable collected by the TEA measures 
all experience a teacher has acquired regardless of the district.  My teacher turnover variable attempts to 
capture only the experience, knowledge, and skills gained from longevity within the district. 
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determine if passive representation can mitigate the negative effects of street-level 
personnel instability, and if teacher stability can counter the negative effects that non-
Black and non-Latino teachers have on the academic attainment of Black and Latino 
students (Meier et al 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991; O’Toole and Meier 2003; Dee 
2005).  
Policy Outcome 
In order to determine the effects of these two variables on the policy outcomes 
for Black and Latino clients, I examined two key indicators: the Black student and 
Latino student pass rate on the state standardized exam or TAKS (Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills) test.  I used the TAKS pass rate as a measure of policy outcomes 
because this exam is required for all students in grades 3 through 8, as well as grade 11, 
and is considered a high stakes test since passing this test is required for graduation in 
Texas (TEA.gov 2010).  In addition, these scores are used by the state to rank districts 
and are considered “the most visible indicator of performance used to assess the quality 
of schools” (O’Toole and Meier 2003, 53).  Black and Latino TAKS rates therefore 
should be of particular focus for all schools seeking to achieve/maintain state/federal 
education policy standards.  
Environmental Forces 
Lastly, I controlled for several constraints and resources that also affect student 
performance such as enrollment, class size, state aid, percent low-income students, 
percent Black students, percent Latino students, the previous year’s Black/Latino TAKS 
pass rates, the white TAKS pass rates, and the percent of teachers with less than five 
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years of experience (Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996).  I chose to control 
for these particular variables because past research has shown that students who attend 
schools with more resources and fewer constraints tend to perform better than students 
who attend schools with limited resources and more constraints (Wenglinsky 1997).   
Controlling for the percent of Black, Latino, and low-income students allows me 
to control for task difficulty because districts with a large percent of poor students and a 
highly diverse student body will find it more difficult to attain high academic 
performance because they have to make up for a less supportive home environment and 
deal with more complex, and more varied learning problems (Curiel, Rosenthal, and 
Richek 1986; Jencks and Phillips 1998).  The control of state aid allows me to control 
for the financial resources of each district, since research confirms that students 
attending schools with more resources generally perform better (Wenglinsky 1997; 
Krueger 1999).  Furthermore, controlling for the academic performance of whites in the 
model allows me to control for district quality since it allows me to compare how Black 
performance fares relative to white students, who are often the highest performing 
students in districts.  A lag of the dependent variable is also included since the previous 
year’s pass rates are often a key predictor for the next year’s rates.  This allows me to 
account for the cumulative influences of prior family, school, and peer factors on current 
achievement (Boardman and Murnane 1979; Todd and Wolpin 2003).  Finally I control 
for teachers with less than five years experience given that teachers with more teaching 
experience are more effective and associated with higher student performance.  Teaching 
with less than five years of experience differs from teacher turnover as it refers to any 
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teaching experience gained by an individual.  The experienced assumed by the teaching 
turnover variable refers to only that gained through experience within a specific district.  
The basic model for my analysis therefore is: 
Minority Academic Performance = Teacher Stability + Passive Representation +Teacher 
Stability*Passive Representation + controls + ε 
Since this type of cross-sectional, time-series analysis needs to be concerned with 
violating the assumptions of the classical linear regression, I used an OLS with clustered 
robust standard errors model and fixed effects for years in order to resolve the issues that 
often plague panel data.  According to Hamilton (1992), multicollinearity is present 
when the variance inflation factor, or VIF, for a variable is over ten (135).  For my 
models multicollinearity was initially present.  This was to be expected given the 
relationship between the variables in the education production function.  In order to 
reduce the multicollinearity certain control variables, such as teacher salary, were 
removed from the model, as they did not significantly increase the explanatory power of 
the model.  As a result, multicollinearity was greatly reduced.  Finally, in order to 
establish a baseline relationship between stability and passive representation on the 
academic performance of Blacks and Latinos, I ran the same regression without the 
interaction term since there is very little literature on the effects of teacher stability on 
the academic attainment of different racial groups6 (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; 
Terry and Kritsonis 2008). 
                                                 
6 Appendix A 
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Findings 
Stable and Representative School Districts- Blacks 
In the regression7 (Table 2) both the key independent variables of teacher 
stability (.060) and Black representation (0.189) were statistically significant8.  This 
finding supports the conclusions drawn in the personnel stability and representative 
bureaucracy literature (Lipsky 1980; Meier et al 1989; Selden 1999).  This finding also 
helps to ease any potential doubts that teacher stability is a harmful phenomenon for 
Black students as some scholars would argue that any staff that stays in an organization 
too long can become “deadwood” and prevent the organization from being responsive to 
the needs of their changing clientele9 (Ingersoll and Smith 2003).  The interaction term 
of teacher stability*Black representation (-.001) was not statistically significant which 
demonstrates that there is no interactive effect between these two variables.  Given that 
my hypotheses were based on a range of data rather than one point, the marginal effects 
were graphed in order to determine the effects of personnel stability in unrepresentative 
districts and passive Black representation in unstable districts on the performance of 
Black students10 (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). 
                                                 
7 Mean VIF is 4.20.  
8 P < .05 
9 However this relationship must be examined in order to determine if the relationship is curvilinear. 
10 All control variables were in their expected directions. 
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Independent Variable 
Coefficient (Robust 
Standard Error) 
Teacher Stability 
.060* 
(.024) 
Passive Representation 
.189* 
(.075) 
Teacher Stability*Passive 
Representation 
-.001 
(.001) 
Lagged Black TAKS Pass Rate 
.492* 
(.014) 
White TAKS Pass Rate 
.428* 
(.023) 
Enrollment (Logged) 
.328* 
(.163) 
Class Size 
-.018 
(.083) 
Percent State Aid 
.025* 
(.008) 
Percent Latino Students 
-.016 
(.011) 
Percent Low Income 
-.013 
(.014) 
Percent Black Students 
-.115* 
(.021) 
Teachers with less than 5 years 
experience 
.042 
(.014) 
Constant 
-4.99* 
(3.09) 
N= 10608   
R²= .735   
* if p < .05   
Table 2. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on                       
Black Performance  
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 The first hypothesis is not supported since there is no interactive relationship.  
However I do find that stability improves Black performance within representative 
organizations and has a significant effect11 on the performance of Black students until 
teacher stability reaches 90% (see Figure 1).  This suggests that one way to improve the 
academic performance for Blacks, and potentially close the Black-white achievement 
gap, resides in a district’s ability to maintain a stable teaching workforce.  
While this finding is in congruence with the current literature, it fails to support 
my theory of interactive effects between these two management strategies.  This is quite 
interesting as one would expect that if teacher stability is significant and passive 
representation is significant the two together should also be significant.  Perhaps the two 
strategies do not have an interactive effect because they do not create a separate set of 
skills or unique knowledge.  Black teachers should come into a district already knowing 
some of the unique characteristics of Black students.  While these teachers learn new 
skills and procedures the longer they stay in the district, this new knowledge may not be 
specifically geared to improving the academic performance of Black students.  Thus, 
there is no interactive effect.  A similar argument can be made for teacher stability.  The 
positive and significant effect of personnel stability suggests that stable teachers will 
increase the academic performance of Black students.  It is possible that over time 
teachers learn how to adjust their teaching style to improve the performance of Black 
                                                 
11The lack of significance beyond 90% is most likely due to a lack of cases in this range.  After plotting 
the data to examine its distribution only 10 of my 10,608 cases fell in this range. 
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students.  However this knowledge is no different than the knowledge that Black 
teachers had in the first place, therefore preventing an interactive effect from happening. 
 
 
 
    
   Figure 1. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black Performance 
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     Figure 2. The Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability on Black Performance 
 
 
 
Stable and Representative School Districts- Latinos
12
 
 In the initial non-interactive regression both the variables of teacher stability 
(.026) and passive representation (.067) were statistically significant13.  This finding 
further supports the current personnel stability and representative bureaucracy literature 
(Meier and Stewart 1991; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  This finding also suggests that 
teacher stability in general is not as harmful for Latino and Black students as some race 
scholars have thought. This finding is especially relevant to education given that some 
scholars fear that teachers who have been in a district for too long are not be able to 
                                                 
12 Mean VIF is 7.99.  
13 P < .05 
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shake the preconceived notions and prejudice they hold against minority students, 
though a separate analysis is needed to examine if this relationship may taper off at some 
point.     
   In the regression with the interaction term (Table 3) the key independent 
variables of teacher stability (.011) and Latino representation (0.029) were not 
statistically significant. The interaction term of teacher stability*Latino representation 
(.001) was not significant which further demonstrates that there were no interactive 
effects.  Given the possible issues associated with interaction terms and 
multicollinearity, I chose to graph the marginal effects of each strategy in order to 
determine the effects of personnel stability in unrepresentative districts and passive 
Latino representation in unstable districts on the performance of Latino students 
(Brambor et al 2006).  
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Independent Variable 
Coefficient (Robust Standard 
Errors) 
    
Teacher Stability 0.011  
(.014) 
Latino Representation 0.029 
 (.038) 
Teacher Stability* Latino 
Representation 
0.001 
 (.0004) 
Lagged Latino TAKS pass rate .458* 
 (.012) 
White TAKS pass rate .433* 
 (.015) 
Enrollment (logged) -.278*  
(.101) 
Class size 0.07  
(.055) 
State Aid 4.39E-09  
(2.78E-09) 
Percent Low Income Students 0.00004 
 (.009) 
Percent Black Students -0.032* 
 (0.01) 
Percent Latino Students -0.085* 
 (0.008) 
Teachers with Less than 5 years of 
Experience 
-0.0004 
 (.009) 
Constant -22.62* 
 (1.65) 
    
N= 15914  
R²= .760   
* if p <.05   
Table 3. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Latino Performance  
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It appears that my first hypothesis is not supported, as stable and representative 
organizations do not have a significant effect on the performance of Latino students.  
However stability does improve the academic performance of Latinos within 
representative districts (see Figure 3).  This suggests that one way to improve the 
academic performance for Latinos and close the white-Latino achievement gap also 
resides in a district’s ability to maintain a stable teaching workforce.  This finding is the 
exact same relationship that I found for Black students which gives some credibility to 
my previous argument.  Despite the heterogeneity of Latinos, the knowledge that Latino 
teachers have before they enter the district may be enough to improve the academic 
performance of Latino students.  The additional skills gained through longevity in the 
organization may be general, and therefore not specially targeted to learning the nuances 
of their Latino students.  Likewise teacher stability should improve non-Latino teachers 
of knowledge of the unique traits of Latino students so that they reach the same level of 
information that Latino teachers have.  However this knowledge may not extend beyond 
this point therefore preventing an interactive effect from occurring. 
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Figure 3. The Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability on Latino Performance 
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Figure 4. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino Performance  
 
 
Unstable and Representative School Districts- Blacks   
However, since managers may be unable to pursue both personnel stability and 
representative bureaucracy due to the many external factors affecting their organizations 
(i.e. budget cuts, prospective employees, changes in hiring and training standards, etc), it 
is important to understand if passive representation is still significant in unstable 
districts.  Since these managers still seek to meet state standards and improve their 
responsiveness to, and therefore the policy outcomes for their clients, I sought to 
determine if passive representation still improved Black performance when there was 
personnel instability.  
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From this graph (see Figure 1) it appears that the second hypothesis, while not 
completely supported due to a lack of interactive effects, shows that passive 
representation does have a positive and significant impact on the Black TAKS pass rate 
in unstable schools.  This finding, while not exactly as I hypothesized, is good news for 
both the representative bureaucracy literature as well as for Black students.  This finding 
demonstrates that even in very unstable organizations, such as those experiencing a loss 
of 30% of their bureaucrats from the previous year, passive representation can still lead 
to positive outcomes for Black students (Shen 1997; Carroll et al 2000; Scafidi et al 
2002; Loeb et al 2005).  This further demonstrates the importance of representative 
bureaucracy to improving the policy outcomes for Black students.  It also offers 
additional support to the argument made in the previous two sections.  Passive 
representation and teacher stability may both lead to the acquisition of similar 
knowledge, thus the lack of stability does not affect the information that Black teachers 
have about Black students.  This would allow them to have a positive effect on Black 
academic performance in any environment as passive representation works as a 
substitute for personnel stability.     
Unstable and Representative School Districts- Latinos  
Given the results found for Black students, I sought to determine if passive 
representation retained its positive effect on the academic performance of Latino 
students within unstable schools.  From this graph (see Figure 4) it appears that with 
extremely high levels of personnel instability (less than 55% of teacher returning) 
passive representation has no significant effect on Latino academic performance.  
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However whenever the distribution of the data is considered, the graph does show a 
similar relationship to the one found for Black students.  When we consider that the 
average amount of teachers returning the next year is only 81% in Texas14, a district that 
only has 56% of teachers returning is still a very unstable organization.  The marginal 
effects graph shows that passive representation has a positive and significant effect on 
the Latino TAKS pass rate once teacher stability reached 56%.  Given that very few of 
the cases fall below 57.3%, this finding suggests that the strategy of representative 
bureaucracy have a positive effect on the educational policy outcomes for Latino 
students15 within unstable and stable school districts.  
As a result, this finding demonstrates that passive representation, while not 
having an interactive effect with personnel stability, can still improve the educational 
policy outcomes for Latino.  Although determining whether the increase in performance 
stems from the active representation of Latino academic interest by Latino teachers or 
the role model effect will require qualitative research, this initial analysis suggests that 
when given limited resources in which to use to improve Latino performance, pursuing 
representative bureaucracy as a substitute for personnel stability will allow for beneficial 
policy outcomes for Latinos in unstable environments. 
Stable and Unrepresentative School Districts- Blacks 
 On the other hand creating and maintaining a representative bureaucracy is not 
always a viable option given the lack of African Americans choosing to pursue a career 
                                                 
14 85% is the national average. 
15 This value (57.3%) is two standard deviations of the mean.  
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in education (Irvine 1989).  As a result, attempting to maintain a stable workforce may 
be the best strategy a manager can pursue as they attempt to accomplish policy goals.  I 
therefore examined the effects of personnel stability within unrepresentative 
organizations on Blacks’ academic performance (see Figure 2).  I found that personnel 
stability has a positive and significant effect on the educational policy outcomes for 
Black students in organizations in which passive representation16 is less than 18%.  
   According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, unrepresentative 
organizations should not be associated with positive policy outcomes for minorities 
(Pitkin 1967; Meier 1993b; Selden 1997).  Likewise several studies have demonstrated 
that Anglo teachers are associated with negative outcomes for Black students (Meier et 
al 1989; Dee 2005).  However, these studies did not consider the role of personnel 
stability.  While the effect is not one that is mitigating, personnel stability still works to 
improve the performance of Black students in both representative and unrepresentative 
school districts.  Therefore this strategy could be used as a substitute for passive 
representation and thus be the best course of action for public managers to pursue if they 
seek to improve the academic performance of Black students but cannot create a 
representative bureaucracy.  While this finding does not completely support my third 
hypothesis, it does offer support to the theory of personnel stability as one way to 
improve the policy outcomes for Black students.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Most cases fall in this range. See Appendix B for the distribution of the data. 
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Stable and Unrepresentative School Districts- Latinos 
In contrast to Blacks, I find that personnel stability only leads to positive policy 
outcomes for districts that have passive representation above 10% (see Figure 3).  Thus 
it appears pursuing the strategy of personnel stability as a replacement and/or in lieu of 
creating a representative bureaucracy will only increase the Latino TAKS pass rate in a 
limited amount of unrepresentative organizations.  This is quite an interesting finding.  
Personnel stability, while significantly related to Latino performance in the non-
interactive regression, does not have a positive effect in the organizations that have the 
least amount of representation.  This suggests that in these organizations the status quo 
of poor Latino performance continues.  Furthermore, in the previous sections it became 
apparent that passive representation continues to have a positive effect on the Latino 
TAKS pass rate in both stable and unstable organizations.  This finding suggests that not 
only does personnel stability not mitigate the negative effects of passive representation, 
but that in terms of improving the educational policy outcomes for Latinos, increased 
passive representation may be the driving factor.  While this does not support my 
hypothesis, it does demonstrate an alternative strategy for some unrepresentative 
organizations to pursue, if hiring more Latinos is not a feasible option. 
The fact that there is a significant effect also offers additional support to the 
argument that personnel stability and passive representation allows educators to obtain 
the same type of knowledge about their Latino students and thus one strategy may be 
able to be used as a substitute for the other.  Additional qualitative and quantitative 
research is needed however to isolate what specific skills and procedures are being used 
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to improve the performance of Latino students.  If through interviews, I find that both 
Latino teachers and stable teachers use similar techniques and teaching styles, then the 
argument that passive representation and personnel stability both lead to the acquisition 
of similar knowledge can be accepted.  However, without this information on teaching 
styles, procedures, perceptions, and/or advocacy, I cannot readily accept this alternative 
theory.  
Unstable and Unrepresentative Districts- Blacks 
 Finally the effects of completely unstable and unrepresentative school districts on 
the Black TAKS pass rate can be seen in the constant term.  These types of schools are 
significantly related with a 4.99 percentage point decrease in the TAKS pass rates of 
Black students, which is in line with the current literature.  We must consider how 
critical this impact is given that Blacks already pass the TAKS at lower rates than do 
Anglos (TEA.gov 2010).  Already low Black academic performance is compounded by 
the inability of unstable and unrepresentative organizations to effectively identify, and 
respond, to the academic needs of minority students, which works to perpetuate 
educational inequality (Jencks and Phillips 1998).   The detriment of unstable and 
unrepresentative districts becomes even more evident, given that 1) Blacks are more 
likely to attend these types of schools, and 2) poor academic performance also decreases 
the likelihood that these students will graduate (Cohen and Tyree 1986).  Thus the 
impact of the negative policy outcomes associated with unstable and unrepresentative 
school districts are more likely to affect Black students, and extend far beyond the time 
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the student spends within the organization.  This results in the perpetuation of 
educational inequality between Blacks and Anglos. 
Unstable and Unrepresentative School Districts-Latinos 
The effects of completely unstable and unrepresentative school districts on the 
Latino TAKS pass rate can also be seen in the alpha, or constant, term.  These types of 
schools are significantly related with a 22.62 percentage point decrease in the TAKS 
pass rates of Latino students.  Thus just as is the case with Blacks, already low Latino 
academic performance is compounded by the inability of unstable and unrepresentative 
organizations to effectively identify, and respond, to the academic needs of minority 
students, which works to perpetuate educational inequality (Jencks and Phillips 1998). 
 This is even more relevant when we consider that Latinos are more likely to live 
in areas in which teacher stability is an issue.  For example, 27% of Latino fourth grade 
students did not have the same teacher at the beginning and the end of the year, which is 
10% higher than for Anglo students.  Likewise 25% of Latino high school seniors 
experience teacher absenteeism everyday as compared to 11% of Anglo seniors (ETS 
2003).  When we also take into account the fact that Latinos comprise 22% of students 
but only 7% of teachers nationwide, the detriment of unstable and unrepresentative 
districts becomes even more evident, given that poor academic performance also 
decreases the likelihood that these students will graduate (Cohen and Tyree 1986).  Thus 
the impact of the negative policy outcomes associated with unstable and 
unrepresentative school districts continue to enable educational inequality between 
Latinos and Anglos. 
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Discussion 
 It is evident from these results even if there were no interactive effects of the 
management strategies of representative bureaucracy and personnel stability there are 
some interesting relationships to consider.  This analysis demonstrates that passive 
representation can improve the educational policy outcomes for Black and Latino 
students in both stable and unstable organizations.  This demonstrates that representation 
is not affected by the environmental factor of personnel stability.  This makes it a 
beneficial strategy for public managers to pursue if they seek to achieve the goals set by 
top managers, the state, and NCLB.  Likewise personnel stability works to improve the 
performance of Black and Latino students in both representative and in some non-
representative school districts.  Thus it is a beneficial strategy to pursue if 
superintendents and school administrators seek to improve the outcomes of minority 
students.  Both of these findings suggest that even if there is not an interactive 
relationship between these two strategies, there is a substitution effect.  
  If, for example, a district realizes that they are unable to hire minorities in order 
to match the demographic of their clientele due to a lack of applicants, then pursuing a 
strategy of maintaining a stable teaching workforce may be the next best course of action 
in order to ensure that Black and Latino students perform well and meet the standards set 
by state and federal education policies.  The district should implement programs that 
foster relationships between newer and older teachers in order to shorten the learning 
curve of new teachers, and therefore decrease the chances that the addition of new 
teachers will hinder the district’s ability to maintain high performance (O’Toole and 
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Meier 2003; Loeb et al 2005).  In addition administrators need to determine what types 
of fiscal and non-monetary incentives are needed in order to deter teachers from seeking 
out jobs in different districts or outside of education (Loeb et al 2005). 
 Likewise, if a district is constantly experiencing changes as it attempts to deal 
with high turnover and comply with new teaching certification standards, administrators 
within the district should consider hiring teachers that match the demographic of their 
clientele a priority.  This strategy is one way in which the school can improve the 
outcomes for their minority students and reduce the disparities in minority and white 
students’ performance.  Since Black and Latino teachers also improve the performance 
of white students, these hiring decisions serve to even further benefit the district as it 
would help prevent the takeover of the district by the state if certain policy goals are not 
met (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).  It also could increase the likelihood that they 
would receive the additional performance-based funding needed to better educate 
students and retain teachers. 
 The reality of these findings also has other repercussions for education policy as 
a whole.  In both models passive representation and personnel stability had a positive 
effect.  Given that fewer individuals are entering the teaching profession and making it a 
long term career, and that fewer Blacks are choosing to become educators, the future of 
Black and Latino education looks bleak (Irvine 1989; Ingersoll 2003).  Unless 
legislators, educators, and administrators can find some way in which to make teaching a 
more attractive profession, recruit minorities to enter the profession, and/or keep 
teachers from leaving the field, Black and Latino students will continue to perform at 
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lower rates then Anglos.  This would spell the continuation of the Black-white and 
Latino-white achievement gap which in turn works to perpetuate the racial disparities we 
see in graduation rates, college attendance, and socioeconomic status (Cohen and Tyree 
1986).   
Given these potential consequences the next step is to engage in qualitative 
research in order to determine if passive representation and personnel stability lead to the 
attainment of similar amounts of information about minority students.  If teachers are 
able to reach similar knowledge levels, how much time is needed within the organization 
in order to acquire this information?  Does the size of the minority student body increase 
the rate at which knowledge is gained? If however, the two strategies result in different 
types of knowledge, then we must ask why is there no interactive effect?  As scholars we 
must address these questions and seek to gain a better understanding of the interpersonal 
relationships and advocate roles these teachers use in order to prescribe a set of 
suggestions that will help to improve the educational policy outcomes for minority 
students in any type of public school organization. 
Conclusion 
First and foremost this study demonstrates that there are no interactive effects 
between the management strategies of personnel stability and passive representation.  
However, additional knowledge on how to improve policy outcomes can be gained from 
examining passive representation within stable and unstable organizations and personnel 
stability within representative and non-representative organizations.  I find that passive 
representation (with or without personnel stability), as well as personnel instability (with 
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or without passive representation) can improve Black and Latino performance and 
potentially help close the achievement gap as one strategy can be used as a substitute for 
the other (Stevenson et al 1990; Steinberg, Dornbusch and Brown 1992).  This offers 
support to the current literature that a stable personnel and a representative personnel are 
associated with positive policy outcomes (Shen 1997; Light 1999; Carroll et al 2000; 
Scafidi et al 2002; Loeb et al 2005).  It also suggests that these two strategies lead to the 
attainment of certain levels of knowledge that allow stable teachers and representative 
teachers to improve performance.  As mentioned before, qualitative research will be 
needed in order to better determine if the knowledge is similar or if it is different and just 
has similar effects that prevent it from having an interactive effect.  
Another interesting finding from this study is within unrepresentative school 
districts, a stable teaching workforce does not have any significant effects on the 
performance of Latino students once passive representation drops below 20%. This 
suggests that at least for Latinos, passive representation may be more important in terms 
of improving policy outcomes.  This relationship may have something to do with the 
language barrier between Latino students and non-Latino teachers.  Perhaps when 
passive representation is below 20% the information transmitted from teacher to teacher 
is more general knowledge on how to improve student performance rather than race or 
language specific.  Additional research is still needed however in order to better 
understand why stability does not always have a positive effect on the academic 
attainment of Latinos.  
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In response to these preliminary findings, my future quantitative and qualitative 
research will focus on the nature of these bureaucrat/client relationships in order to 
determine exactly what mechanism is leading to a substitution effect rather than an 
interactive effect.  For example, do minority students respond differently to minority and 
non-minority teachers despite their usage of similar teaching techniques?  Or do 
minority and non-minority teachers use different techniques based on different 
information?  Are the benefits of Latino teachers in unstable schools primarily the result 
of Latino students experiencing the role model effect (Dee 2005)?  Do unrepresentative 
teachers (under 20%) within stable schools fail to improve Latino performance because 
they lack the role model effect?  I believe that further understanding these interpersonal 
relationships is the next step in helping public managers choose the combination of 
strategies that will improve the policy outcomes for minorities, and therefore help them 
comply with state and federal standards. 
While I expect to find similar results in organizations that are decentralized and 
allow street-level bureaucrats great discretion, there may be differences depending on 
the nature of the service/good provided, as well as the amount of coproduction needed to 
experience positive policy outcomes. For example, test scores are not a zero sum good, 
and students are required to do quite a bit of work themselves if they wish to perform 
well.  Welfare benefits however are a zero sum good, and while they require 
coproduction from clients by complying with regulations, the nature of the good itself 
may limit the bureaucrat’s ability to improve the outcomes for all of their clients.  Thus I 
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would advocate for the application of this study to other agencies in order to determine 
the generalizability of these findings.  
I also encourage scholars to consider how the other forms of stability can interact 
with passive representation not only at the street-level, but also at the top and middle 
management level.  For certain organizations mission stability may be of more relevance 
then say technological stability, while in others the discretion of middle and/or top 
managers may limit the discretion awarded to street-level bureaucrats.  Consequently 
only through the systematic examination of these theories can we fully understand the 
impact that stability and representative bureaucracy will have on the policy outcomes for 
minority clients, and thus be able to make recommendations on how to best meet the 
needs of all clients. 
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CHAPTER III 
MINORITIES AND POLICY TOOLS 
Effective, efficient, and responsive (Lipsky 1980).  These are the characteristics 
that every public organization is supposed to have.  Scholars however, have yet to 
suggest a managerial strategy that will allow agencies to embody all of these qualities.  
In the last twenty years scholars, as well as citizens, have also demanded that public 
organizations add an additional task to their workload: addressing the racial inequality in 
public policy outcomes.  When we consider the wide range of policy goals, the many 
demographics that comprise an agency’s clientele, and the diverse personnel working 
within these organizations, it is no surprise that scholars have yet to create a general 
theory as to how agencies can improve their responsiveness to best meet the policy 
needs of each and every client.  Despite all of these factors however, empirical research 
has found two strategies that can help public organizations achieve these goals. 
  The first public management strategy is the theory of representative bureaucracy.  
Representative bureaucracies are agencies that share the same demographic traits as their 
clientele.  This enables them to achieve public policy goals more effectively and 
efficiently than more homogenous organizations (Selden 1997).  The basic premise of 
this concept is that a representative bureaucracy can better identify the needs of its 
clients due to shared life and socialization experiences (Selden 1997).  The identification 
of such interests consequently allows the organization to be more responsive to the needs 
of those that are often underrepresented and negatively impacted by public policies, such 
as minorities (Lim 2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  Given the increasingly 
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diverse society in which we live in, as well as the continuation of racial disparities in 
policy outcomes, this theory continues to be advocated as one way to improve 
organizational responsiveness to minority clients and increase equality in policy 
outcomes (Meier et al 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991; Dee 2005). 
The second public management strategy that has also found support is personnel 
stability.  This theory argues that personnel stability improves policy outcomes because 
bureaucrats who have worked within the same agency for an extended period of time 
have the opportunity to develop a specialized skill set that allows them to efficiently and 
effectively meet the needs of their specific clientele (Dunn 1997; Light 1999; O’Toole 
and Meier 2003).  While employee turnover can bring new ideas and outlooks to an 
agency, it can also produce or intensify problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, 
therefore decreasing performance and responsiveness (Light 1999).  As a result, some 
scholars contend that the key to improved responsiveness and achieving policy goals lies 
in an organization’s ability to maintain a stable workforce (O’Toole and Meier 2003). 
While both of these theories have been supported through empirical research, it is 
evident that the representative bureaucracy literature fails to mention the significance 
personnel stability plays when it comes to policy outcomes.  Likewise the stability 
literature rarely discusses the importance of passive representation when it comes to 
improving organizational responsiveness.  Thus this study seeks to examine the 
interactive relationship between these two concepts.  The overall goal is to determine 
how to improve organizational responsiveness and performance in order to achieve 
better, and more equal, policy results for minorities.  Therefore this analysis begins to 
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answer the broad question: What are the combined effects of the management strategies 
of personnel stability and representative bureaucracy on public policy outcomes?   
Given that it has been documented that policy tools influence policy outcomes, 
this study focuses specifically on the effects that these two management strategies have 
on the types of policy tools used by bureaucrats towards minority clients in order to exact 
client compliance within the organization’s rules and regulations (Schneider and Ingram 
1993; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Roch et al 2010).  The relationship between punitive 
policy tools usage and negative outcomes has been especially well documented within the 
realm of education (Brown 2007; Skiba and Noam 2002; Roch et al 2010).  As a result, 
this analysis examines how the interactive relationship of personnel stability and passive 
representation affects the type of punitive policy tools used against minority students. 
Thus this study attempts to answer the following questions: Does street-level personnel 
stability mitigate or exacerbate the use of punitive policy tools against minorities when 
there is no passive representation? Does passive representation mitigate or exacerbate 
the use of punitive policy tools against minorities in unstable public organizations?      
In order to answer these questions Texas public school districts are used as a 
proxy for public organizations.  These districts have been chosen because of their highly 
decentralized structure, the great amount of discretion that street-level bureaucrats have in 
this organization, and the large amount of data collected in regards to the use of discipline 
against students (Meier and O’Toole 2003; TEA.gov 2010).  This allows me to examine 
how street-level personnel stability and passive representation affect the punitive policy 
tools used against minority students over a ten year period.  Thus this analysis will allow 
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me to determine if certain types of organization (i.e. representative and unstable, stable 
and unrepresentative, etc.) are associated with an increase or decrease in the use of certain 
punitive policy tools against minority students.   
Given that minorities still experience unequal levels of punishment within the 
public school setting, this study has implications for not only public management, but 
also for education policy (Skiba 2000; Skiba, Michael, and Peterson 2002; Roch et al 
2010).  Due to the fact that the type of policy tool used can dramatically impact a 
student’s academic performance, and thus their future education and economic 
opportunities, as well as the fact that minorities continue to experience lower academic 
attainment than Anglos (another sign of unequal education outcomes), determining what 
organization(s) actually decreases the usage of such tools is one way to reduce the racial 
inequalities we see in public education today (Ekstorm, Goertz, Pollack, and Rock 1986; 
Hawkins, Doueck, and Lishner 1988; DeRidder 1991).  In the end this study finds some 
support of an interactive relationship between the theory that representative bureaucracy 
and the theory of personnel stability. 
Literature Review 
Policy Tools and Performance 
Punitive policy tools directly affect policy outcomes.  In the case of education the 
tool selected often has a critical impact on the student’s academic attainment (DeRidder 
1991; Brown 2007; Skiba and Noam 2002; Roch et al 2010).  Some of the more punitive 
tools, such as those related to discipline, can have especially harsh consequences for 
minorities (Brown 2007; Roch et al 2010).  This occurs because these policy tools are 
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often used to “stigmatize behavior, and consequently the group linked with the behavior” 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342; see also Schneider and Ingram 1997).  Research has 
shown that these types of punitive tools send negative messages to the students, and can 
negatively impact their academic performance (Skiba and Noam 2002; Brown 2007).  
While this happens to all students, it is especially the case for minority students (Skiba 
and Noam 2002; Brown 2007).  In extreme cases, clients choose to abstain from using 
services, which in terms of education means dropping out of school, which is already a 
significant issue for minorities who have higher dropout rates and lower academic 
achievement than Anglos (DeRidder 1991).  This poses a problem since it indicates that 
supposedly “neutral” public organizations are selecting and using policy tools in ways 
that actually perpetuate, rather than mitigate, educational inequality (Skiba and Peterson 
1999; Verdugo 2000).  Thus it is important to understand if representative bureaucracy 
and personnel stability can interact in ways to mitigate these inequalities.  
Representative Bureaucracy and Policy Tools 
The theory of representative bureaucracy argues that “the demographic 
characteristics of bureaucrats affect the distribution of outputs to clients who share these 
demographic characteristics” (Wilkins and Keiser 2006, 87).  This theory identifies two 
forms of representation: passive and active (Pitkin 1967).  Passive representation occurs 
when the individuals within the bureaucracy have the same demographic characteristics 
(race, gender, etc) as that of the clientele it serves.  Active representation occurs when 
bureaucrats who have discretion advocate for the interests of a particular clientele in 
order to diminish or eradicate the discrimination that has affected this group (Mosher 
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1982; Hindera 1993).  In order for passive representation to lead to active representation, 
two conditions must be met.  First the policy must be one in which the bureaucrats have 
substantial discretion, and second it must be a policy area that is salient for the 
demographic characteristic in question (Meier 1993a; Wilkins and Keiser 2006).  
Based on these criteria, scholars have examined the impact that minority 
bureaucrats have on the policy tools used against minority clients in public education, 
since this is a policy arena in which bureaucrats have considerable discretion, as well as 
one that has historically had negative impacts for these groups.  Scholars find that low 
levels of Black and Latino representation are associated with increases in the rates at 
which Black and Latino students were punished (Meier et al 1989; Meier and Stewart 
1991; Roch et al 2010).  Dee (2005) also finds the non-co-ethnic teachers are more likely 
to view non-co-ethnic students as disruptive and troubled then are same-race teachers.  
Coincidently these are the same characteristics often used to justify the use of punitive 
policy tools against students and help to explain why minorities continue to be 
disciplined at unequal rates (Skiba 2000; Skiba et al 2002).  
Implicit in these studies of representative bureaucracy is the idea that non-
minority bureaucrats are not associated with beneficial policy outcomes for minorities 
(Meier 1993b; Selden 1997; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  Thus without the 
presence of minority bureaucrats to change, or re-socialize, the values and beliefs of 
non-minority bureaucrats, non-minority bureaucrats will be unable to “reduce ignorance 
and rejection; [in order to] increase bureaucratic understanding of minority views and 
feelings” (Krantz 1974, 435; see also Lim 2006).  An example of this can be seen in 
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Roch et al’s (2010) study.  They find that with an increase in the proportion of minority 
teachers, minority students of the same ethnicity experienced lower rates of expulsions 
and suspensions (see also Rocha and Hawes 2009).  Their explanation for this finding is 
that these districts, due to the presence of minority teachers, were more aware of the 
negative ways in which punitive policy tools impact minority students.  Consequently 
they were more likely to adopt more learning oriented discipline policies and provide 
more beneficial policy outcomes for underrepresented groups (Roch et al 2010, 53).  
Thus the literature has some evidence that the presence of minority bureaucrats can lead 
to a more responsive organization, improved program performance, and fewer punitive 
policy tools used against minorities. 
Stability and Policy Tools 
In the public management literature scholars have identified five different forms 
of stability (Allison 1971; Wilson 1989; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  While there is 
research on how all five forms affect bureaucratic responsiveness and policy outcomes, 
the focus of this study is personnel stability17 given that these are the individuals (i.e. 
street-level bureaucrats) responsible for implementing broad federal/state/district 
policies and ensuring that clients comply with organizational rules (Selden 1997; Keiser 
et al 2002; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  Personnel stability is critical because even though 
employee turnover can lead to positive changes such as the introduction of new 
perspectives and ideas, it can also create or worsen problems of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness within the agency (Light 1999).  
                                                 
17 As a concept personnel stability refers to the changes in organizational personnel (Light 1999).   
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Too much turnover can also exacerbate “the difficulties involved in building 
competence, mutual trust, and long-term commitment” (O’Toole and Meier 2011, 137; 
see also Barzelay and Armajani 1992; Dunn 1997; Elmore 1997).  This hinders an 
organization’s ability to effectively respond to the needs of its clients.  Street-level 
bureaucrats benefit from personnel stability because it can ease the heavy workloads 
they often carry, as well as decrease the often erratic nature of the relationships they 
have with clients (Lipsky 1980; Meier and O’Toole 2007).  The longer bureaucrats are 
employed in these organizations the more effectively they can deliver services to their 
clients due to the development of specialized skills and routines.  Since bureaucrats 
develop these skills in response to their organizational surroundings, they are able to 
handle certain cases better than are other street-level bureaucrats who lack experience 
with this particular clientele (Lipsky 1980).  Since this skill set is so specialized 
however, it often does not shift from bureaucracy to bureaucracy, thus making street-
level bureaucrat stability important to managers if they seek to efficiently and effectively 
improve responsiveness and accomplish their policy goals (O’Toole and Meier 2003).    
Given the benefits of personnel stability it is apparent why turnover is a concern 
especially for those within public education (Golembiewski 1990; O’Toole and Meier 
2003).  Recent studies have shown that teachers who leave a district or exit the 
profession completely often attribute it to several factors including high proportions of 
poor performing and minority students and student discipline problems (Shen 1997; 
Carroll et al 2000; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2002; Ingersoll 2003; Loeb et al 
2005).  When we also consider that high teacher turnover means that a district must 
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constantly hire new teachers in order to replace the teachers who are leaving, these 
problems can create a vicious cycle.  If discipline problems are already factors pushing 
teachers out of public schools, then it is highly likely that the additional personnel 
instability generated by these issues will only further exacerbate these discipline 
problems. This occurs because new teachers are rarely as effective as those who have 
been in the district longer given that they must learn (often through trial and error) what 
combination of skills and policy tools will work best for their particular classroom, as 
well as how to deal with the daily disruptions (such as students acting out) that can 
hinder their ability to control the classroom (O’Toole and Meier 2003).  
 While there is little research on the direct effects of street-level personnel 
stability on student discipline rates and policy tool usage, one can make inferences from 
studies that indirectly examine this relationship.  Stable teachers should be more likely to 
enforce school rules fairly and consistently due to their knowledge of the district’s 
formal and informal discipline policies.  They should also be better able to choose the 
tool that works best for their clientele’s long term academic interests (Skiba and Noam 
2002; Brown 2007).  These teachers therefore should choose extremely harsh policy 
tools (such as expulsions and suspensions) only when they are absolutely necessary.  
Unstable teachers, lacking the knowledge gained from constant contact with their 
clientele as well as a “lack of adequate teaching expertise for making… decisions and 
providing support and mentoring,” should choose whatever tool they believe the 
“infraction” warrants, regardless of the effect it has on a student’s future academic 
attainment (Loeb et al 2005, 44).   
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Therefore, one can assume that with the presence of lower-level personnel 
stability, a public organization should only use punitive policy tools when they are 
needed to help them accomplish both its short term (i.e. maintain a safe environment) 
and long term mission and goals (i.e. provide a quality education to students).  An 
unstable street-level personnel on the other hand should use punitive policy tools as their 
primary means of exacting client compliance given their lack of experience with the 
clientele as well as their focus on the short term goal of controlling the classroom 
(Sanders and Rivers 1996; Darling-Hammond 2004).   
Missing Relationship in the Literature 
From the literature it is apparent that representative bureaucracy scholars tend to 
attribute increases in responsiveness and policy benefits mostly to demographic traits.  
While these studies support the representative bureaucracy literature in that they 
demonstrate that passively representative bureaucrats can lead to the use of fewer and less 
punitive policy tools for minority clients, they do not examine the potential effects that 
street-level stability can have for minority clients in unrepresentative bureaucracies 
(Wilkins and Keiser 2006; Keiser et al 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  The 
fact that management scholars have found that stability can improve the responsiveness 
of street-level bureaucrats to their clientele’s unique needs suggests that representative 
bureaucracy scholars, by ignoring personnel stability’s effects on policy tool usage, have 
overlooked an integral component of organizational responsiveness and performance.    
This is particularly relevant given the lack of literature examining the effects of 
personnel stability on punitive policy tool usage. Within education the use of tools such 
 63 
 
as expulsions have been shown to be more detrimental to the graduation rates of 
minorities then are the less punitive policies, such as in school suspensions (ISS), since 
they actually segregate students from the rest of the student body (DeRidder 1991; 
Strauss 2001; Owen 2005).  This segregation can create feelings of alienation/isolation 
which can lead to delinquency and eventually student attrition (Hawkins et al1988).  
These punitive tools also often come with the stipulation that the work missed cannot be 
made up for a grade and the absences associated with delinquency and out-of-school 
suspensions (OSS) can add up to the point that students are denied credit and have to re-
take classes.  
This combination often serves as an incentive for students, especially if they are 
low performing, to simply dropout, which severely limits their future educational and 
economic opportunities (Ekstorm et al 1986).  Given the severity of these consequences, 
we must determine how the various combinations of street-level personnel 
stability/instability and representation/lack of representation affect the use of such tools 
against minorities.  This is especially true if we seek to reduce the unequal use of 
punitive disciplinary measures against minority students and improve the academic 
performance of minorities so that it reaches parity with Anglos (Campbell et al 2000; 
Loveless and Diperna 2000).   
Theory 
Representation, Stability, and Schools  
While the larger goal is to apply these findings to public agencies in general, I 
have chosen to test this theory using public school districts since their structure makes 
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them ideal for testing both theories simultaneously (O’Toole and Meier 2003).  For 
example, even though teachers operate under the basic state and district curricula, they 
are allowed great discretion in the ways in which they choose to implement these 
disciplinary policies through their choice to report infractions, recommend punishments, 
and the tools used to exact compliance (Roch et al 2010).  This large amount of 
discretion awarded to teachers combined with the well known unequal rates at which 
Blacks and Latinos are disciplined relative to whites satisfies both theoretical conditions 
needed for representative bureaucracy (discretion and a policy area salient to a particular 
group) to be considered as a realistic management strategy, as well as for passive 
representation to lead to the active representation of minority interests (Selden 1997; 
Campbell et al 2000; Loveless and Diperna 2000). 
 Schools also satisfy the basic requirements for personnel stability to be 
considered a feasible management strategy since the majority of the district’s 
disciplinary policy implementation is done by street-level bureaucrats.  These teachers 
have the responsibility of implementing specialized procedures that allow them to 
maintain a safe and distraction free learning environment (Light 1999).  Once they have 
a system in place that is perceived as effective for their clientele, it is highly unlikely that 
they would change it.  Moreover, the benefits of teacher stability have already been 
documented in the education literature, as scholars find that if new/inexperienced 
teachers have any concerns in implementing district/state-wide policies they tend to turn 
to a teacher who has been in the district for an extended time for guidance (Nettle 1998; 
Kauffman et al 2002).  This occurs because the teachers with more tenure within the 
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district (the stable lower-level personnel) are more knowledgeable about the students’ 
specific behaviors, needs, and problems due to their daily interactions with these 
students.  Thus they are able to instruct new teachers on how to implement policies that 
are responsive to the needs of their students.  Studies have supported this claim as they 
find that a stable teacher workforce can successfully improve the students’ educational 
policy outcomes (i.e. academic performance) (Kauffman et al 2002).  Thus the same 
logic should be applicable to the choice of disciplinary policy tools used.  
I argue therefore that personnel stability and passive representation should lead to 
a decrease in the use of discipline tools against minority students since these 
organizations should be the most responsive to these clients.  Conversely, those 
organizations that have no street-level bureaucrat stability and lack passive 
representation should increase the use of these policy tools against minority clients since 
they should be the least responsive to their specific interests.  While both of these 
arguments fall in line with the literature, what will be the most interesting will be the 
outcomes when I examine unstable, but passively representative organizations and stable 
organizations that lack passive representation.  In these cases I expect the benefits of 
stability to mitigate the negative effects often associated with an unrepresentative 
bureaucracy, as well as passive representative to mitigate the negative effects of 
instability.  Therefore, I propose that these two very different organizations should 
decrease the use of punitive policy tools against minority clients.  In order to better 
illustrate my theory, I have created a specific hypothesis for each type of the four 
organizations in my analysis. 
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H1: Stable and representative schools will decrease the usage of punitive policy tools 
against minority students. 
I argue that as schools become more stable and passively representative they 
should decrease the use of punishments (OSS, ISS, and expulsions) towards minority 
students.  First, as is in line with the theory of representative bureaucracy, minority 
teachers should share similar life experiences and socialization processes as minority 
students, and therefore have a better understanding of their unique needs.  They should 
also be more familiar with the cultural differences of minority students, such as the 
vernacular/language used and clothing styles worn (Irvine 1989).  Minority teachers 
should therefore be less likely to perceive minority students as potential troublemakers or 
as being overly aggressive the way that non-minority teachers who are not familiar with 
these traits would.  Minority teachers should also have a better understanding (either 
through personal experience or anecdotes from friends) of the unequal rates at which 
minority students are disciplined, and thus be less inclined to use these tools in order to 
stigmatize what are simply the behaviors associated with the culture of minority students 
(Owen 2005; Hinojosa 2008; Payne and Welch 2010). 
These benefits should be amplified by the fact that the specialized skills and 
procedures gained from personnel stability should help minority teachers to choose the 
right punishment for the violation.  These minority teachers, knowing the long term 
consequences associated with extremely harsh forms of punishment (i.e. dropping out, 
poor performance, etc.) and the impact that these issues can have on overall 
organizational performance, should prefer less punitive tools in hopes that they can 
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increase the likelihood that minority students stay in school and graduate (Meier et al 
1989; DeRidder 1991).  Likewise, the stability of these teachers should make the use of 
less punitive punishment techniques an organizational norm, and therefore they should 
decrease the use of policy tools against minority students.  
H2: Unstable and unrepresentative schools will increase the usage of punitive policy 
tools against minority students. 
I hypothesize that as organizations become more unstable and passively 
unrepresentative they should increase the usage of punitive policy tools against minority 
students.  Since these non-minority teachers do not share similar cultural values or life 
experiences they are unlikely to understand the unique speech patterns, language, or 
clothing styles of minority boys and girls (Irvine 1989).  This lack of understanding 
works to reinforce the stereotypes that non-minority teachers often hold against minority 
students, such as being troubled, disrespectful, and belligerent (Irvine 1989; Skiba 2000; 
Skiba et al 2002; Dee 2005).  As a result, non-minority teachers should be more willing to 
use punitive policy tools in order to stigmatize the behavior associated with minority 
culture by disciplining minority students for subjective “violations” that they would not 
usually report Anglo students for such as defiance, disrespect, and threat (Skiba et al 
2002; Gregory and Weinstein 2008). 
Furthermore, when the current context of public education is considered, the 
teacher shortage and the ever growing population of school age children, it is inevitable 
that classes will become much larger (Blasé 1986; Ingersoll and Smith 2003; Barnes, 
Crowe, and Schaefer 2007).  Non-minority teachers in unstable schools should have an 
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even greater incentive to use punitive policy tools in order to control the classroom and 
limit distractions.  These teachers, feeling overwhelmed and highly stressed within this 
unstable environment, may reach for punitive policy tools for any infraction that disrupts 
the classroom because they immediately remove the problem student from the classroom 
and allow the teacher to quickly return to his/her teaching duties (Blasé 1986).   
 The use of these highly punitive policy tools also serve as a visual reminder to 
other students to behave, and therefore by using these tools often, teachers may believe 
that not only will the student being punished learn to behave more quickly, but also the 
rest of the students will understand what behaviors are not tolerated.  This is even more 
likely to occur when we consider that many schools now have zero-tolerance policies in 
which teachers have the right to immediately remove any student they believe is an 
immediate threat to the safety of themselves or any other students (Skiba and Rausch 
2006).  
The lack of stable employment within the organization should also prevent these 
teachers from learning better, more positive ways to help minority students, and instead 
adopt the tools used by other non-minority teachers.  This “rubber stamping,” which 
occurs whenever “bureaucrats adopt the opinions of other bureaucrats in order to aid in 
the decision-making process,” is a technique used whenever bureaucrats are confronted 
with problems that require them to make critical decisions about clients and situations 
with limited information, which would be the case for non-minority teachers in an 
unstable environment (Lipsky 1980, 130).  A non-minority teacher in an unstable 
environment may see these tools as a way to ease their workload so that they can devote 
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more time to teaching, and thus achieving the school’s goal of improving performance 
without regard for the long term effects it can have on students’ academic attainment 
(Blasé 1986).  Consequently in these districts I expect to find the increase use of punitive 
policy tools against minority students. 
H3: Unstable and representative schools will decrease the usage of punitive policy tools 
against minority students.  
As schools become more unstable and representative they should decrease the 
usage of punitive policy tools against minority students.  The fact that minority teachers 
should have a better understanding of the unique characteristics of minority students 
given their shared life experiences and interests should mitigate the tendencies of these 
teachers to reach for the most punitive policy tools in order to stigmatize cultural 
behaviors/attitudes like non-minority teachers would (Roch et al 2010).  These shared life 
experiences should also mean that these minority teachers should have less work-related 
stress (in regards to adjusting to their new clientele) than unstable and unrepresentative 
teachers given that they have a better understanding of their clientele before they even 
enter the district (Lipsky 1980).  In addition, since discrimination through the use of 
unequal punishment against minority students remains a salient issue in the minority 
community, representative bureaucracy should prevent these teachers from overusing 
punitive policy tools against minority students (Rocha and Hawes 2009; Roch et al 2010).  
Likewise, the fact that high levels of unequal discipline can affect academic performance 
(both for the student and the organization), these teachers should be hesitant to abuse any 
tools that can decrease the performance of students in a district that is already unstable 
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and most likely poor performing (Deridder 1991; Brown 2007).  Therefore I expect that 
minority teachers in unstable districts will decrease the use of punitive policy tools 
against minority students. 
H4: Stable and unrepresentative schools will decrease the use of punitive policy tools 
against minority students.      
Finally, I hypothesize that as organizations become more stable and 
unrepresentative they should decrease the use of harsh policy tools against minorities.  
Non-minority teachers, due to their stable employment within the district, should be 
familiar with the unique characteristics, behaviors, and speech patterns of minority 
students.  Consequently they should no longer view these traits as aggressive and 
disrespectful or use punitive policy tools in order to deter such behaviors (Skiba 2000; 
Skiba et al 2002; Dee 2004).  These stable teachers should also be well aware of the 
negative effects that harsh forms of discipline can have on students’ academic 
performance and future attainment, and therefore choose not to punish minorities for 
trivial issues the way that unstable and unrepresentative teachers would (Skiba and 
Rausch 2006; Roch et al 2010).  
Furthermore, personnel stability should allow teachers to establish a formal and 
informal rubric for discipline based on the unique needs of the clientele.  Since these 
teachers should also understand the long term performance consequences of such tools 
for all students as well as the organization, they should only use these types of punitive 
punishments for extreme cases (Deridder 1991; Brown 2007).  Consequently, personnel 
stability should give these teachers the chance to create other tools that can better address 
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the needs of their students, thus decreasing the need and use of harsh forms of discipline 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993; Schneider and Ingram 1997). 
Thus in terms of policy tool usage for minority students are hypothesized to be: 
 
 
 
 Passively Representative Unrepresentative 
Stable Decrease Decrease 
Unstable Decrease Increase 
Table 4. Theoretical Expectations for Policy Tools 
 
 
Data and Methods 
The data for this study comes from the Texas Education Agency from 2000-
2010.  This dataset is composed of demographic data for students and teachers, as well as 
measures of district expenditures, student enrollment, and student discipline rates by 
district, which allow me to examine this interactive relationship across districts for ten 
years.  The data also allow me to control for other factors that contribute to the usage of 
such policy tools.  Using school districts18 as my unit of analysis allows me to specifically 
focus on how street-level bureaucrats affect the policy tools used against a specific group 
because of the large amount of discretion awarded to these individuals (Selden 1997).  In 
addition, the diversity of these schools suggests that these findings will be generalizable 
to other educational systems as “well organizations with similar characteristics (highly 
                                                 
18 It is also the most disaggregated unit available given that school and individual level data is not 
available given federal privacy policy. 
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professionalized organizations with discretion vested in street level bureaucrats)” (Keiser 
et al 2002; see also Meier and O’Toole 2003). 
In this study teacher stability19 is defined as the stable year to year employment 
of teachers.  Therefore the independent variable of teacher stability is measured as the 
percent of teachers that return from the previous school year20.  The independent variable 
of Black passive representative is measured as the percent of Black teachers within the 
district, and the variable of Latino passive representation is measured as the percent of 
Latino teachers within the district.  I have chosen to examine the effects of representation 
and stability on Blacks and Latinos separately in order to ensure that one group does not 
mask or alter the effects of another.  This is a possibility given that even though a Latino 
teacher, for example, is a minority, he/she is still not the same race as a Black student.  
Given the argument posited by the theory of representative bureaucracy, it is logical to 
expect that this relationship would be different than if the teacher was a co-ethnic (Selden 
1997).  
 In order to test the hypotheses and better understand the relationship between 
representation and personnel stability the interaction term of Teacher Stability*Passive 
Representation was created.  The use of this interaction in the model allows me to 
determine if passive representation can mitigate the potentially negative effects of street-
                                                 
19 Teacher stability is used instead of teacher experience since the variable collected by the TEA measures 
all experience a teacher has acquired regardless of the district.  My teacher turnover variable attempts to 
capture only the experience, knowledge, and skills gained from longevity within the district. 
20 A district with less than 68.5% teacher stability is considered unstable. This is one standard deviation 
below the mean.  
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level personnel instability, and if teacher stability can counter the negative effects that 
non-minority teachers have on the tools used to discipline minority students.  
The dependent variables of punitive policy tools will be measured as the 
percent/number of minority students expelled, who received out of school suspensions 
(OSS), and who receive in-school suspensions (ISS).  The controls will be those that 
account for district resources and constraints such as enrollment (logged), the percent of 
Black students, the percent of Latino students, the percent of low income students, 
teacher experience, the percent of teachers without a teaching permit, and the white 
discipline rate (Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996).  The variables of teacher 
experience and teachers without a permit are measures that allow me to determine that the 
relationships found are associated with teacher stability within the same organization 
rather than just experience.  The control of Black, low income, and Latino students and 
enrollment are used to control for task difficulty which may encourage some districts to 
use policy tools differently than others (Curiel et al 1986; Jencks and Phillips 1998).  The 
study also controls for the white discipline rate in order to determine if representative 
bureaucracy and passive representation matter beyond the effects they have on Anglo 
students. 
Since this type of cross-sectional, time-series analysis needs to be concerned with 
violating the assumptions of the classical linear regression, I used an OLS with clustered 
robust standard errors model and fixed effects for years in order to resolve the issues that 
often plague panel data.  According to Hamilton (1992), multicollinearity is present 
when the variance inflation factor, or VIF, for a variable is over ten (135).  For my 
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models multicollinearity was initially present.  This was to be expected given the 
relationship between the variables in the education production function.  Consequently 
the key independent variables were centered in order to reduce the multicollinearity 
Findings 
Expulsions 
 There does not appear to be any significant relationships between the three key 
independent variables of teacher stability (.073), passive representation (.110), and 
teacher stability*passive representation (.005) and the percent of Black students expelled 
(Table 5).  The same insignificant relationship can be found for the variable of teacher 
stability*passive representation (.002) and the percent of Latino students expelled (Table 
6).  On the other hand there is a positive and significant relationship for the variable of 
teacher stability21 (.403) which runs counter to the expectations that a more stable 
teaching force would be less likely to use the most punitive form of punishment given 
their knowledge of the negative effects it has on student achievement.  However, given 
that I found that personnel stability and passive representation can still be statistically 
significant in different districts (due to issues of multicollinearity with the interaction 
term), I have graphed the interactive relationships22 in order to determine effects of each 
strategy within a range of organizations (Brambor et al 2006). 
                                                 
21 Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
22 See Appendix A for the non-interactive models. 
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Independent Variables 
Coefficient  
(Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
.110  
(.138) 
Teacher Stability 
.073 
 (.270) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.005 
 (.015) 
Percent of Anglos Expelled 
-.441*  
(.069) 
Percent of Black Students 
.513* 
 (.140) 
Percent of Latino Students 
-.748* 
 (.111) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
.342* 
 (.099) 
Enrollment (logged) 
-2.34* 
 (.950) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.001 
 (.002) 
Teacher Experience 
-.481 
 (.689) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.165* 
 (.071) 
Constant 
74.47* 
 (16.83) 
    
N= 471   
R²= .752   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
Table 5. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on         
Black Expulsions 
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Independent Variables 
Coefficient  
(Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
-.153†  
(.087) 
Teacher Stability 
.403* 
 (.146) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.002  
(.006) 
Percent of Anglos Expelled 
-.504* 
 (.060) 
Percent of Black Students 
-.753* 
 (.107) 
Percent of Latino Students 
.703* 
 (.120) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
-.118 
 (.080) 
Enrollment (logged) 
-2.35* 
 (.756) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
-.002 
 (.002) 
Teacher Experience 
-.332 
 (.557) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.031 
 (.083) 
Constant 
84.80* 
 (12.35) 
    
N= 623   
R²= .767   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
Table 6. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Latino Expulsions 
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 Stable and Representative Districts 
 From the graph (Figure 5) and the lack of significant coefficient it appears that 
stable and representative school districts do not have a statistically significant interactive 
effect on the Black student expulsion rate.  A similar relationship is evident when the 
Latino student expulsion rate is examined (Figure 6).  Both of these findings run counter 
to the first hypothesis.  While these types of school districts are not related with 
increases in the usage of the harshest form of discipline, the fact that they do not 
decrease its usage suggest that Black students still experience unequal rates of discipline 
in the organizations that theoretically should be related to the best outcomes.  The effect 
of this finding is even more detrimental when we consider the long term effects of 
expulsions on students.  As mentioned before expulsions are related to decreases in 
future academic attainment, fewer life chances, and a lower socioeconomic status than 
students that are not expelled. 
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Figure 5. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black Expulsions 
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     Figure 6. The Marginal Effect of Passive Representation on Latino Expulsions 
 
 
 In terms of the implications for Latino students, an interesting relationship 
emerges (Figure 6).  It has been established that Latinos tend to be disciplined at higher 
rates and with harsher tools than Anglo students (Meier and Stewart 1991).  This 
regression analysis also suggests that a one percent increase in teacher stability by itself 
is related to a .403 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos expelled.  While 
this does not support my hypothesis, there is a potential explanation for this positive and 
significant relationship.  Given that expulsions are the harshest policy tool, teachers must 
have the approval of a principal or vice principal before the student is expelled (Texas 
Education Code sec.37.009).  Since this process must be done very carefully as a 
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mistake or objection from the student’s parents could result in a lawsuit, it makes since 
that a stable rather than unstable organization would have the personnel and structure in 
place in order to successfully implement this tool.  Likewise stable schools should be 
more likely to have a set of guidelines that dictate what infractions lead to what 
punishments given that the stability of the bureaucrats would have allowed for the 
creation of organizational norms and procedures (Skiba and Rausch 2006).  Thus even if 
the guidelines in place are biased against Latino students, teacher discretion is limited 
with this type of tool.  While this explanation is plausible, the fact remains that neither 
personnel stability nor passive representation can decrease the percent of Latino students 
expelled as hypothesized.  
Unstable and Unrepresentative Districts 
 The effects of unstable and unrepresentative districts, in the most extreme cases 
of no stability or representation, can be determined by examining the constant term. 
These types of districts (74.47) are significantly related to an increase in the percent of 
Black students expelled.  Likewise, they are also significantly related (84.80) to an 
increase in the percent of Latino students expelled.  Both of these findings offer support 
to hypothesis two, in that stable and unrepresentative districts are associated with 
increases in usage of policy tools against minority students. 
Unstable and Representative Districts 
 Unstable and representative districts do not have a significant effect on the 
percent of Black and Latino students expelled (Figures 5 and 6).  This finding does not 
support hypothesis three.  It is feasible that a lack of stability could prevent teachers and 
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administrators from forming a unified organizational rubric when it comes to 
disciplinary procedures.  Given the severity of expulsions, the additional personnel 
needed in order to successfully implement this tool, and the fact that parents and students 
have the right to appeal, it is possible that an unstable organization does not have the 
resources needed in order to use this tool effectively.  Therefore they reserve this tool for 
extreme cases, such as bringing a weapon to school.  Thus a lack of representation has 
no real effect on the rates at which minorities are punished.  As mentioned before even 
though there is some good news in that these types of organizations do not increase the 
usage of the harshest form of punishment, the fact that they do not decrease it suggests 
that minorities students continue to experience the status quo, which in terms of 
discipline means being punished at unequal rates (Meier et al 1989; Meier and Stewart 
1991).    
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    Figure 7. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black Expulsions 
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     Figure 8. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino Expulsions 
 
 
 
Stable and Unrepresentative Districts 
  Finally it appears that stable and unrepresentative districts do not have a 
significant effect on the percent of Black students expelled (Figure 7).  This finding does 
not support hypothesis four.  The fact that there is no relationship for Black students is 
disheartening as it hints at the idea that no combination of personnel stability and passive 
representation can help reduce the percent of Black students expelled.  Given that being 
expelled from school increases the probability that a student will simply dropout of 
school or experience low achievement at another school, this relationship as well as the 
other three examined implies that Black students will also continue to experience lower 
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academic achievement and lower graduation rates than Anglo students (Hawkins et al 
1988). 
Personnel stability however does have a significant and positive effect on the 
percent of Latino students expelled within unrepresentative districts, though this 
relationship is not interactive (Figure 8).  While this is not a mitigating relationship 
given the insignificant coefficient, it runs counter to what was expected in hypothesis 
four.  Personnel stability itself is associated with an increase in the percent of Latino 
students expelled.  It is also positive and significant when passive representation is low 
or missing the relationship.  This collection of findings suggests that in terms of Latino 
expulsions, personnel stability has a greater effect than passive representation.  More 
research is needed in order to better understand why this occurs, but based on this 
analysis it appears that the previous argument explains why stability increases the use of 
the harshest form of punishment against Latino students.  As mentioned before stable 
schools should be more likely to have the resources and personnel in place in order to 
successfully use this policy tool.  Thus these stable teachers could be bound by a set of 
procedures that are, for the most part, unaffected by personal discretion (Skiba and 
Rausch 2006).  However as mentioned before this still means that we can expect Latinos 
to experience unequal rates of discipline which in turn will affect their achievement, 
graduation rates, and life chances (Ekstorm et al 1986). 
One may wonder why there is such a difference between Black and Latino 
expulsions within the same type of district.  A possible explanation is the cultural 
differences between the two groups.  Teachers in stable school districts may not perceive 
 85 
 
Black students as big a threat or problem as Latino students given that they speak the 
same language.  Teachers, in accordance with the districts’ disciplinary procedures, may 
use the harshest form of discipline to either stigmatize the use of Spanish or because of a 
misunderstanding given the language barrier.  However before this explanation can be 
accepted, qualitative research is required.   
Out-of-School Suspensions (OSS) 
 In the model for the percent of Black students receiving OSS two of the key 
independent variables are statistically significant (Table 7).  A one percent increase in 
the amount of passive representation is related to a .166 percentage point decrease in the 
percent of Black students receiving OSS.  There is a similar relationship for the percent 
of Latino students receiving OSS as a one percent increase in Latino teachers is 
associated with a .063 percentage point decrease (Table 8).  Both of these findings are 
what we would expect to occur given the theory of representative bureaucracy (Selden 
1997).   In both models the variable of passive representation*teacher stability were 
positive and significant which suggest a mitigating relationship.  However in order to 
understand the interactive relationship between these two strategies, I once again 
graphed the marginal effects (Brambor et al 2006).  
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Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
-.166*  
(.084) 
Teacher Stability 
.015 
 (.048) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.004* 
 (.002) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving OSS 
-.412* 
 (.034) 
Percent of Black Students 
.919* 
 (.083) 
Percent of Latino Students 
-.515* 
 (.045) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
.108* 
 (.034) 
Enrollment (logged) 
.108 
 (.354) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0002 
 (.0006) 
Teacher Experience 
.131 
 (.166) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.008 
 (.054) 
Constant 
45.35* 
 (5.84) 
    
N= 3735   
R²= .785   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
Table 7. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Black OSS 
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Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
-.063*  
(.025) 
Teacher Stability 
-.0006 
 (.039) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.003* 
 (.001) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving OSS 
-.292* 
 (.001) 
Percent of Black Students 
-.566* 
 (.053) 
Percent of Latino Students 
.826* 
 (.040) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
-.152*  
(.025) 
Enrollment (logged) 
-.373 
 (.282) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.001  
(.0003) 
Teacher Experience 
.485* 
 (.133) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
.053 
 (.053) 
Constant 
30.30* 
 (4.70) 
    
N= 4124   
R²= .863   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
Table 8. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Latino OSS 
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Stable and Representative Districts 
In both models there is no complete significant relationship between stable and 
representative districts and the percent of Black (Figure 9) and Latino (Figure 10) 
students receiving OSS (due to the width of the confidence intervals).  Only from 68.5% 
(the cut off for stable districts) to 79% stability for Blacks and 81% stability for Latinos 
do these types of organizations reduce the percent of minorities receiving OSS.  These 
findings therefore do not fully support the first hypothesis that stable and representative 
school districts should decrease the usage of all punitive policy tools against minority 
students.  When this finding is placed in a larger context, the implications become 
clearer.  OSS is a harsh form of punishment since it removes the student from the school 
for several days.  It has been documented as a tool that is related to increasing students’ 
feelings of alienation and isolation in a way similar to being expelled, and as a result can 
lead to poor academic performance and increase the likelihood of dropping out 
(Hawkins et al 1988).  Given that we expect school districts to strive to maintain a stable 
and representative workforce as they theoretically are expected to improve student 
performance, it is possible that this type of organization is actually counterproductive to 
these efforts when it comes to minority students.  However more research is needed 
before any conclusions can be drawn. 
Furthermore this is similar to the relationship found for expulsions.  A potential 
explanation for this is that perhaps teachers in these stable districts must follow the 
disciplinary rubric for OSS as well as expulsions. Given the opportunity for students to 
fight the decision and the need for school administrators to be involved, teachers in 
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stable districts may have little discretion when it comes to this policy tool as the rubric 
for disciplinary procedures should become stricter as personnel stability increases (Texas 
Education Code sec. 37.009).  This makes sense since more stability allows for teachers 
and administrators to create a certain organizational culture of discipline based on their 
experiences with the clients within their district.  Thus the lack of discretion prevents 
them from being able to decrease the usage of OSS against Black and Latino students.  
 
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
P
a
s
s
iv
e
 R
e
p
re
s
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
0 20 40 60 80 100
Teacher Stability
Marginal Effects of Passive Representation
95% Confidence Intervals
DV: Percent of Black Receiving OSS
The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black Out-of-School Supensions with Teacher Stability
 
     Figure 9. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black OSS 
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Figure 10. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino OSS 
 
 
Unstable and Unrepresentative Districts 
 Unstable and unrepresentative school districts are significantly related to an 
increase in the percent of Black and Latino students receiving OSS.  This is in line with 
the second hypothesis and further demonstrates the detrimental effect that unstable and 
unrepresentative districts can have on minority students.  These types of districts have 
been shown to decrease the academic performance of minority students on one of the 
most visible forms of student performance.  Given the results of this analysis, minority 
students can also expect to be punished at higher rates and with harsher forms of 
discipline, which works to decrease their academic performance even more.  This 
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implies that minority students will continue to have lower rates of academic attainment 
than do Anglos as long as they attend these types of districts.  
Unstable and Representative Districts 
 In both graphs (Figures 9 and 10) it appears that unstable and passively 
representative districts are significantly and negatively related to the percent of Black 
and Latino students receiving OSS.  While this offers support to the third hypothesis it 
calls into question as to why stable and representative school districts do not yield the 
same result.  One possible explanation is that since these districts are already low 
performing due to the personnel instability, teachers may want to avoid using any harsh 
policy tools such as OSS that can also reduce overall performance, and instead choose 
other forms of discipline (Meier et al 1989).   Given that these districts should not have 
the same rigid guidelines as those in stable schools, these teachers may be able to 
exercise more discretion and lower the rate of minorities who receive OSS.  Teachers in 
stable and representative districts on the other hand are more likely to be in districts that 
already have a strict set of guidelines for what punishments should be used for each type 
of infraction (Skiba and Rausch 2006).  As a result, teachers may not be able to use their 
discretion, even if they know the long term effects that this policy tool can have on 
student performance.  However, before this explanation can be accepted additional 
research in the form of interviews or surveys must be done. 
Stable and Unrepresentative Districts 
 Finally it appears that stable and unrepresentative school districts do not have a 
significant impact on the percent of Black and Latino students receiving OSS (Figures 
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11 and 12).  This finding does not support hypothesis four, but is interesting since 
passively representative and unstable organizations were significantly related to a 
decrease in the percent of Black and Latino students receiving OSS.  Given this 
relationship, one could conclude that at least for OSS, passive representation is the real 
driving force in terms of decreasing the percent of Black and Latino students being 
punished with this particular policy tool.  While unrepresentative and stable 
organizations do not increase the rates at which minorities are punished, they allow the 
status quo of unequal punishment to occur.  Consequently these minority students may 
be more likely to drop out of school than other students who are not punished, which 
would drastically affect their life chances, future academic attainment, and 
socioeconomic status.  Thus it may be tentatively concluded that while personnel 
stability cannot decrease the percent of Black and Latino students receiving OSS, 
passive representation can mitigate the detrimental effects that personnel stability has on 
minority discipline rates.   
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Figure 11. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black OSS 
 
 94 
 
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
T
e
a
c
h
e
r 
S
ta
b
ili
ty
0 50 100
Passive Representation
Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability
95% Confidence Intervals
DV: Percent of Latinos Receiving OSS
The Marginal Effects of Teacher Stability on Latino Out-of-School Suspensions with Passive Representation
 
Figure 12. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino OSS 
 
In-School Suspensions (ISS) 
 The variable of passive representation is significant in both the Black (Table 9) 
model (-.190) and the Latino (Table 10) model (-.099).  This is similar to the relationship 
found for OSS, and as previously mentioned, in line with the current literature on 
representative bureaucracy (Selden 1997).  The variable of passive 
representation*teacher stability (.002) is significant23 for the model of the percent of 
Latinos receiving ISS, which is also similar to the OSS relationship and also suggest a 
mitigating relationship.  In order to further compare the relationship that passive 
                                                 
23 Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
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representation and personnel stability have on punitive policy tool usage, I once again 
graphed the marginal effects. 
 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
-.190*  
(.074) 
Teacher Stability 
.008  
(.028) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.002 
 (.002) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving ISS 
-.197* 
 (.029) 
Percent of Black Students 
1.29* 
 (.065) 
Percent of Latino Students 
-.218* 
 (.036) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
-.001 
 (.021) 
Enrollment (logged) 
.771* 
 (.230) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0004 
 (.0003) 
Teacher Experience 
-.132  
(.117) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.047 
 (.038) 
Constant 
18.21* 
 (4.40) 
    
N= 5768   
R²= .865   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
Table 9. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Black ISS 
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Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation 
-.099* 
 (.016) 
Teacher Stability 
.027 
 (.024) 
Passive Representation * Teacher 
Stability 
.002† 
 (.001) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving ISS 
-.332* 
 (.029) 
Percent of Black Students 
-.523* 
 (.041) 
Percent of Latino Students 
.817* 
 (.038) 
Percent of Low Income Students 
-.107* 
 (.016) 
Enrollment (logged) 
.435* 
 (.213) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0003 
 (.0002) 
Teacher Experience 
.126 
 (.084) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.022 
 (.024) 
Constant 
31.61* 
 (4.34) 
    
N= 7098   
R²= .923   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
  
Table 10. The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on 
Latino ISS 
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 Stable and Representative Districts 
 From the graphs it appears that stable and representative school districts have 
different effects on the percent of Black (Figure 13) and Latino (Figure 14) students 
receiving ISS.  As seen in the other models, there is no significant relationship between 
these types of districts and the percent of Black students receiving ISS once stability 
passes 85%, which does not fully support the first hypothesis.  This suggests that at least 
for Black students, pursuing the strategy of maintaining a stable and passively 
representative bureaucracy will only help to decrease the rates at which OSS and ISS are 
used in a small range of stable and representative organizations.  Knowing the unequal 
rates at which Black students are disciplined, as well as the effects that discipline in any 
form can have on students’ academic performance, it is quite possible that the type of 
organization that is considered the “gold standard” actually works to continue inequality 
between groups. 
 However in the model for Latinos, there is a negative and significant effect 
between stable and representative districts (for the full range of stable and representative 
districts) and the percent of Latinos receiving ISS.  This does support the first hypothesis 
in that these types of school districts should decrease the usage of all punitive policy 
tools against minority students.  Given that ISS is one of the most common punishments 
given to students, this finding suggests that with the presence of stability and 
representation Latinos should experience this form less, which would lead to more 
equality in the rates in which they are punished as compared to Anglos. 
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Figure 13. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Black ISS 
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Figure 14. The Marginal Effects of Passive Representation on Latino ISS 
 
 
A puzzle also emerges from these findings as the results for Black and Latinos 
differ.  Perhaps there is a cultural difference that allows for different levels of discretion 
between Black and Latino teachers within these ranges of stable districts.  It is possible 
that Latinos teachers are called upon to discipline Latinos especially if the student 
primarily speaks Spanish.  As a result these stable teachers have the opportunities to 
limit the use of ISS that Black teachers do not.  Furthermore since ISS is the least 
punitive, it should allow for more discretion in its implementation with this group.  Since 
there is little need for principal or parent involvement, it is possible that Latino teachers 
are able to exercise their discretion when it comes to ISS even within the most stable 
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setting.  Black teachers on the other hand may not affect the usage of this tool beyond a 
certain point because they do not have to overcome a language barrier which gives 
stable, Latino teachers more discretion with this tool.  Only through the use of interviews 
will I be able to better understand this phenomenon. 
Unstable and Unrepresentative Districts 
 Unstable and unrepresentative districts are positively and significantly related to 
the percent of Black and Latino students receiving ISS.  This is the exact same 
relationship found for both expulsions and OSS and offers support to the second 
hypothesis.  This suggests that not only are unstable and unrepresentative schools having 
a direct impact on academic performance, but that they are also indirectly decreasing 
performance even more given the drastic increase punitive policy tool usage associated 
with these types of districts. 
Unstable and Representative Districts 
 In terms of unstable and passively representative districts, there is a negative and 
significant relationship for Latino students and no significant relationship for Black 
students (Figures 13 and 14).  This partially supports my third hypothesis.  Given that 
unstable and unrepresentative districts are associated with increases in the rates at which 
Latino students receive ISS, this finding proposes that the introduction of passive 
representation to unstable districts can be one way to decrease these rates.  In the end 
this has the potential to not only create more equitable outcomes when it comes to 
discipline, but also work to improve the academic performance of Latino students within 
these districts.  While there is no interactive relationship for Blacks, passive 
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representation does have negative and significant effect within some unstable districts.  
While the combination of the two strategies cannot decrease the rate at Blacks receive 
ISS, passive representation on its own does.  When we consider that these types of 
organizations also decrease the rates at which Latinos and Blacks receive OSS the 
argument for passive representation as the driving force gains credibility.  
Stable and Unrepresentative Districts 
 Finally it appears that stable and unrepresentative school districts do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the percent of Blacks and Latinos receiving ISS 
(Figures 15 and 16).  This does not offer support to my fourth hypothesis.  Given the 
previous results this implies that perhaps the argument for strict procedures and Zero 
tolerance policies is possible.  If stable organizations limit the discretion that teachers 
have, then a lack of representation should not affect the rates at which punitive policy 
tools are used against minorities.  However more research is needed in order to 
understand not only why these two groups of teachers differ in their decision to use 
certain policy tools, but also if there are other factors besides race that explain these 
differences. 
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Figure 15. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Black ISS 
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Figure 16. The Marginal Effects of Personnel Stability on Latino ISS 
 
 
Discussion 
 Given these mixed findings, a better way of interpreting these results is to 
examine them by organization type rather than by if they support or do not support my 
hypotheses.  Unstable and unrepresentative school districts have the exact same positive 
and significant relationship for all forms of punishment and for both Black and Latino 
students.  These results are in line with the literature’s expectations of what should occur 
since there is neither passive representation to act on behalf of minority students’ 
interests and needs, nor a stable staff that has had the time to understand the unique 
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characteristics of their clientele and develop more positive ways in which to entice 
students to comply with school regulations (Lipsky 1980; Skiba et al 2002; Dee 2005).   
 I also find, for the most part, a consistent relationship for unstable and 
representative school districts.  Except for expulsions, these school districts are related to 
a significant and negative relationship with the percent of minority students receiving 
OSS and ISS.  Passive representation was negative and significant in both of these 
models, and given the previous findings for unstable and unrepresentative districts, these 
results suggests that passive representation is mitigating the use of punitive policy tools 
against minorities in these particular circumstances.  Same race teachers have a better 
understanding of the cultural attitudes, academic needs, and life experiences of same 
race students, and therefore be less likely to use these tools in situations in which they 
are not absolutely necessary (Owen 2005; Hinojosa 2008; Payne and Welch 2010).  In 
addition, this intimate understanding of their clients should also extend to their 
knowledge of the racial disparities that exist in education, as well as the additional 
negative effects that high teacher turnover can have on performance (Loeb et al 2005).  
Thus these same race teachers are unwillingly to use any form of punitive policy tool 
that can further hinder the academic performance of these students knowing the 
potentially detrimental effects it can have not only on the students’ life chances, but also 
on the school’s overall performance, state ranking, funding, as well as their job security.  
Furthermore the lack of stability allows for these teachers to exercise this discretion 
rather than being bound to a set of standards and procedures created by the organization.  
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These actions therefore work to mitigate the negative effects that stability would have on 
minorities if passive representation was not present. 
 There is even further support for the idea of stable organizations limiting 
discretion when the results for stable and unrepresentative school districts are examined.  
There are no significant relationships for the percent of minority students receiving ISS 
or OSS within these districts.  Given that passively representative and unstable 
organizations were related to decreases in the usage of punitive policy tools, theory leads 
us expect to see decreases in the rates of discipline for these organizations as well.  
However, there are no significant relationships for these two variables, which suggest 
that personnel stability limits the ability of teachers to use their discretion.  If this is true 
then while the hypotheses were not supported, these findings may suggests that stable 
organizations need to reconsider some of the procedures and policies they have in place 
when it comes to disciplining students.  Even though these organizations do not increase 
the rates at which these punitive policy tools are used, they allow the status quo on 
unequal discipline to continue. 
 Based on this explanation, one may wonder why neither strategy, with the 
exception of unstable/unrepresentative organizations, effect for the percent of minorities 
expelled.  While this analysis does not allow me to answer the question, I hypothesize 
that this is due in part to the nature of this particular policy tool.  Teachers can make 
recommendations for each type of policy tool they believe should be used, but in the end 
an administrator must agree with their decision (Texas Education Code sec.37.009).  
Furthermore, the more severe the recommended punishment, the greater involvement 
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administrators’ and parents’ involvement have.  Therefore with the recommendation for 
expulsions, the demographic of the teaching workforce does not warrant the same effect 
as they do for lesser forms of discipline since parents have the opportunity to appeal the 
decision and administrators must be able to justify the expulsion as the only suitable 
form of punishment (Texas Education Code sec.37.009).  
Then why do we see a positive and significant relationship between Latino 
expulsions and personnel stability within unrepresentative districts? As mentioned 
before, this may be related to the language barrier between Latinos and non-Latinos.  
According to Dee (2005), non-co-ethnic teachers are more likely to view non-co-ethic 
students as belligerent and troublesome.  If teachers and administrators have this 
perception, then they will be more likely to use a harsh policy tool (which may be in 
accordance with district policy) in order to exact student compliance (Loeb et al 2005, 
44).  When the language barrier is added to this situation, it is possible that non-Latino 
teachers are quicker to view Latinos as “unteachable,” and thus reach for a tool like 
expulsions given that they cannot communicate with the student.  It is also highly likely 
that the language barrier extends to Latino parents and school administrators.  This 
inability to communicate lowers the chances of having the decision overturned, thus 
increasing the percent of Latinos, but not Blacks, expelled in stable and unrepresentative 
school districts.  Additional research is needed however before this explanation can be 
accepted. 
Finally there is the puzzle that is stable and representative school districts. The 
hypothesized relationship of decreasing the usage of punitive policy tools against 
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minorities only works for the percent of Latino students receiving ISS and some Black 
students.  While I cannot be certain given the limitations of this study, there is an 
explanation that can explain the lack of relationship for minority expulsions and for 
minorities receiving OSS.  
First stable and representative teachers should be fully aware of the negative 
impacts that a policy tool like expulsions or OSS can have on a student’s academic 
attainment as well as their future life chances (Brown 2007; Skiba and Noam 2002; 
Roch et al 2010).  Thus they should be less likely to use such a tool unless it is 
absolutely necessary or required by the district’s disciplinary policy.  When we consider 
the various other individuals (i.e. principals, parents, counselors, etc) involved in the 
disciplinary process within a stable district as well as the disciplinary procedures in 
place, it is even less likely that these teachers alone would have a significant impact on 
the percent of students expelled or receiving OSS.  Given the structured environment 
that they work in, these teachers are unable to use their discretion in ways that reduce the 
rates at which minority students are expelled or receive OSS.  However, only through 
the use of qualitative research can this argument be verified.  
Conclusion 
While this study cannot fully explain why street-level bureaucrats in 
stable/unstable and representative/unrepresentative organizations use certain policy tools 
against minorities, it does serve as a springboard for future studies.  On the quantitative 
end, it would be interesting to determine how representation and personnel stability 
affect middle and top managers’ willingness to support the usage of punitive policy tools 
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by street-level bureaucrats.  This is especially important given that there are many 
procedures that require middle or top manager’s authorization before the policy tool can 
be implemented.  Perhaps it is the case that the stability of these individuals has a greater 
effect on the standard disciplinary procedures, and thus stability/instability at this level 
may yield a larger effect on the rates at which minorities are punished.  Likewise passive 
representation also has a significant effect at this level.  If a manager shares the same 
demographic trait as his/her clientele, then it is possible they would either enact different 
disciplinary guidelines or allow for the use of more discretion on a case by case basis.  
These results, much like the ones presented in this study, however need to be 
supplemented by interviews and focus group in order to fully understand why these 
relationships occur. 
Given the ultimate goal is to create a general theory; it is also be beneficial to 
apply this theory to other public organizations. The combination of applying this theory 
to multiple organizations and to the different levels of bureaucracy allows scholars to 
predict the outcomes a certain clientele could expect to see in a certain type of 
organization. This could potentially allow scholars to identify what organizations have a 
negative impact on minorities and allow public managers to rectify the situation before it 
occurs.  In the end this would serve to create more equitable outcomes between groups, 
which is the ultimate goal for most public organizations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MAGNITUDE OF EFFECTS 
While the previous chapters have demonstrated a variety of relationships 
between street-level personnel stability and representative bureaucracy, they have only 
been able to show the direction in which these relationships run.  This chapter will 
illustrate the magnitude of effects at the mean values, as well as the lowest and highest 
values of the statistically significant region.  In order to determine these values, the 
original equation is rearranged in order to establish the effects of one independent 
variable at certain values of the other. 
Ŷ=β₁Stability +β₂Representation+β₃Stability*Representation +α 
This rearrangement results in two equations:  
Representation = β₂ + β₃(Stability) 
Stability = β₁ + β₃(Representation). 
By substituting in certain values for personnel stability or passive representation, this 
chapter is able to determine the range of effects that occurred in this study24. 
TAKS 
Blacks
25
  
 The mean value of personnel stability demonstrates that for every 1% increase in 
Black representation, there appears to be a .107 percentage point increase in the percent 
of Black students passing the TAKS.  At the highest value of personnel stability (88%) 
                                                 
24 For all of the studies the mean teacher stability value was 87.10%. The mean percent of Black teachers 
we 6.259%, and the mean percent of Latino teachers was 11.15%. 
25 See tables in Appendix B for complete listing of effects. 
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within the statistically significant region, a 1% increase in Black teachers is related to a 
.101 percentage point increase in the Black TAKS pass rate.  At the mean level of 
passive representation a 1% increase in teacher stability is correlated to a .0537 
percentage point increase in the percent of Blacks passing the TAKS.  Likewise the same 
relationship can be found at the highest level of passive representation within the 
significant region.  When Black passive representation is at 10% a 1% increase in 
personnel stability is correlated with a .05 percentage point increase in the percent of 
Black students passing the TAKS.  These effects while small, demonstrate that even if 
the first hypothesis is not supported, pursuing a strategy of personnel stability and/or 
passive representation will improve the policy outcomes for Black students which lends 
further support to the idea of a substitution effect.  Given the continued low performance 
of Black students any effect that leads to improvement in performance is considered 
beneficial.  
 In this study I also find that passive representation will improve the policy 
outcomes for Black students within unstable organizations.  I find that at the lowest 
value of personnel stability (25%) a 1% increase in Black passive representation is 
associated with a .164 percentage point increase in the Black TAKS rate.  Thus there is 
evidence that even within the most unstable schools, Black TAKS performance can be 
improved with the presence of passive representation.  This suggests that if managers are 
having difficulty maintaining a stable workforce, hiring individuals that match the 
demographic of their clientele is one way to improve performance and policy outcomes 
for certain groups. 
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There is also evidence that stability can improve the policy outcomes for Blacks 
within unrepresentative organizations.  At the lowest value of passive representation 
(1%), a 1% increase in personnel stability is correlated with a .059 percentage point 
increase in the Black TAKS rate.  This relationship also demonstrates that organizations 
that lack representation can still improve the policy outcomes for Blacks if they are 
stable.  While this outcome is not expected, according to the theory of passive 
representation, it offers a way for organizations to maintain positive performance for 
minorities (Selden 1997).  This is especially important given that fewer minorities are 
entering fields like education thereby decreasing the likelihood of organizations being 
passively representative or able to maintain equal representation (Irvine 1989).  These 
results therefore support the findings in chapter two in that one strategy can be used as a 
substitute when the other is not a feasible option.   
Latinos 
 The effects on Latino students are very similar to the effects on Black students.  
At the mean value of personnel stability I find that a 1% increase in Latino 
representation is associated to a .1107 percentage point increase in the Latino TAKS 
rate.  There is also a .119 percentage point increase in the Latino TAKS pass rate for 
every 1% increase in Latino teachers when teacher stability is at its highest (90%).  This 
shows that passive representation can improve policy outcomes within stable school 
districts even when the combined effect of stability and representation is not statistically 
significant. 
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At the lowest value of personnel stability (55%) a 1% increase in passive 
representation is correlated with a .084 percentage point increase in the percent of 
Latinos passing the TAKS.  This finding offers further support to the substitution effect 
idea as passive representation can still improve the policy outcomes for Latinos even 
within unstable organizations.  While the magnitude of the effect is smaller than the 
effect within stable organizations, it still offers a way for the managers of unstable 
organizations to improve policy outcomes for minorities.   
 Whenever Latino passive representation is at its mean a 1% increase in personnel 
stability is related to a .0222 percentage point increase in the percent of Latino students 
passing the TAKS.  At the highest value of passive representation (90%) a 1% increase 
in personnel stability is correlated with a .101 increase in the Latino TAKS pass rate.  
This offers additional evidence that personnel stability can improve the academic 
outcomes for Latino students.  Even if the two management strategies do not have a 
combined significant effect, managers are able to improve Latino performance at a 
statistically significant level and reduce educational inequalities by pursing 
representation or stability (Jencks and Phillips 1998).  Likewise at the lowest significant 
value of passive representation (12%) a 1% increase in personnel stability is correlated 
with a .023 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos passing the TAKS test 
which suggests that while the effect is small, pursuing a strategy of personnel stability is 
one way to improve Latino performance within unrepresentative organizations. 
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ISS 
Blacks  
 At the mean value of personnel stability, which also happens to be the highest 
value for stability within the significant region, a 1% increase in passive representation 
is related to a .0266 percentage point decrease in the percent of Black students receiving 
ISS.  While this is not a significant interactive relationship it does show that passive 
representation can decrease the use of punitive policy tools within stable districts.  
 The lowest value of stability within the statistically significant region (60%) also 
demonstrates that a 1% increase in the percent of Black teachers is related to a .07 
percentage point decrease in the percent of Blacks receiving ISS.  This offers additional 
support for the idea that passive representation can decrease the use of punitive policy 
tools against Black students within unstable districts.  
 The marginal effects graph did not show any significant relationships for 
personnel stability at any value of passive representation26.  While more research is 
needed, these findings suggests that in terms of reducing the use of punitive policy tools 
against Blacks, passive representation has a greater effect than personnel stability.  This 
means that even though personnel stability can improve Black performance on the 
TAKS test, it is not enough to decrease the use of ISS.  The lack of relationship signals 
that the cultural differences between Black students and non-Black teachers is too much 
for stability on its own to overcome (Irvine 1989; Dee 2005).  If this is the case than 
                                                 
26 The mean value of passive representation showed that a 1% increase in personnel stability is related to a 
.0205 percentage point increase in the percent of Black receiving ISS. 
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perhaps the addition of training teachers to better understand cultural differences can 
significantly decrease the rates at which Black students receive ISS. 
Latinos 
Using the mean value for personnel stability, one sees a .0644 percentage point 
increase in the percent of Latinos receiving ISS for every 1% increase in passive 
representation.  At the highest value of teacher stability (90%), we see that a 1% increase 
in Latino representation is related to a .081 percentage point increase in the percent of 
Latinos receiving ISS.  Both of these relationships run counter to what was 
hypothesized.  This even more puzzling given that on its own passive representation is 
significantly related to a decrease in the percent of Latinos receiving ISS.  It is even 
more confusing since the lowest value of teacher stability (30%) shows a different 
relationship. At this value a 1% increase in passive representation is associated with a 
.039 percentage point decrease in the percent of Latinos receiving ISS.   
One possible explanation for the difference is that as stability increases districts 
have the opportunity to develop more cohesive and detailed rules of conduct within these 
districts, such as a Zero Tolerance Policy (Skiba, Russ, and Peterson 1999).  These 
policies clearly state the punishment that every infraction warrants, leaving little room 
for teacher discretion or even parental involvement.  Therefore despite their knowledge 
of how punitive policy tools affect minority students’ performance, Latino teachers may 
have little choice in the type of punishment each student receives (Brown 2007).  
Teachers within unstable districts however may punish students based more on 
individual judgment since the lack of stability prevents the creation of a set of norms or 
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such a strict policy.  This is a feasible explanation given that passive representation on 
its own significantly decreased the Latino ISS rate.  However more research is needed 
before this conjecture is accepted.  
One may ask why these results differ from the findings for Black students.  It is 
quite possible that as personnel stability increases and the organization creates more 
uniform codes for discipline Latino teachers may punish Latino students for the use of 
Spanish either to stigmatize their use of the language and encourage students to adopt 
English.  The choice to do this may be made given their knowledge that the use of 
Spanish often leads to increased discrimination in education and the workplace (Garcia-
Bedolla 2009).  This is a feasible explanation given that as stability increases passive 
representation leads to higher rates of Latino students punished.  Black teachers, not 
having to deal with a language barrier will not have this problem and thus they are able 
to decrease the rates at which Black students are punished. 
 There was not a significant relationship when the marginal effects of teacher 
stability were examined27.  This is the exact same relationship that was found for Black 
students, which signals that the same underlying factor is at work.  Personnel stability 
was able to increase the amount of Latinos passing the TAKS even within 
unrepresentative organizations.  It does not have the same effect for ISS rates.  Given 
that minority students are often punished in order to stigmatize certain cultural 
behaviors, it is possible that even though stable teachers do not increase the rates in 
                                                 
27 At the mean value of passive representation there was a .0493 percentage point increase in the percent of 
Latinos receiving ISS with every 1% increase in personnel stability. 
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which minority students receive ISS, they do not have the cultural training necessary to 
decrease these rates (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342; see also Schneider and 
Ingram1997). 
OSS 
Blacks 
 At the mean value of personnel stability, a 1% increase in the percent of Black 
teachers is related to a .1608 increase in the percent of Black students receiving OSS.  At 
the highest significant value of personnel stability (79%), a 1% increase in Black passive 
representation is related to a .15 percentage point increase in the percent of Blacks 
receiving OSS.  At the mean value of passive representation, a 1% increase in teacher 
stability is associated with a .040 percentage point increase in the percent of Blacks 
receiving OSS.  For the highest value of passive representation (80%), there was a .335 
percentage point increase in the percent of Blacks receiving OSS for every 1% increase 
in teacher stability.  Furthermore, for the lowest value of passive representation that was 
significant (22%), a 1% increase in teacher stability was related to a .103 percentage 
point increase in the percent of Blacks receiving OSS.  
All of these findings are similar to what I found for the percent of Latinos 
receiving ISS.  In addition, like with Latinos’ ISS rates, passive representation alone was 
significantly related to a decrease in the rate at which Blacks received OSS.  As 
mentioned before stability is playing a more unique and indirect role than expected.  
OSS is one of the more punitive policy tools that can be used (DeRidder 1991; Skiba and 
Noam 2002; Brown 2007; Roch et al. 2010).  In many districts it also requires a vice 
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principal or principal to authorize the teacher’s recommendation for OSS (Texas 
Education Code. Sec. 37.009).  Stable districts have the opportunity to create a more 
uniform set of rules and norms (i.e. Zero Tolerance Policies) that establish what 
behaviors warrant certain punishments. This results in a decrease in the discretion 
teachers have over this form of discipline.  Thus, even though Black teachers know that 
OSS is extremely detrimental to Black academic performance, they have their hands tied 
regarding this particular situation (Brown 2007).  However in-depth interviews are 
needed before these theories can be accepted. 
There is one exception. The lowest value of personnel stability (15%) is 
correlated with a .106 percentage point decrease in the percent of Blacks receiving OSS 
with a 1% increase in passive representation.  At this low level of stability, the previous 
explanation holds as unstable schools, given the high turnover, do not have the same 
opportunity to establish a uniform organizational culture of policy tool usage resulting in 
principals relying more heavily on the individual decisions that teachers make due to 
their own heavy workload (Light 1999).  These teachers, sharing the same demographic 
trait as their students, are less likely to use OSS given the known negative effects that is 
has on minority student performance ((DeRidder 1991; Skiba and Noam 2002; Brown 
2007; Roch et al 2010).  This is quite possible given that passive representation on its 
own significantly decreased the percent of Blacks receiving OSS.  More research is 
needed in order to fully understand this relationship. 
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Latinos  
 At the mean value of passive representation a 1% increase in teacher stability is 
correlated with a .0275 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos receiving 
OSS.  At the highest value of Latino passive representation (75%), a 1% increase in 
teacher stability is related to a .2244 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos 
receiving OSS.  The lowest value of Latino representation within the statistically 
significant region (50%) demonstrates a .1494 increase in the percent of Latinos 
receiving OSS with a 1% increase in teacher stability.  For the mean value of personnel 
stability, a 1% increase in passive representation is associated with a .1821 percentage 
point increase in the percent of Latinos receiving OSS. At the highest value of teacher 
stability within the statistically significant region (78%) a 1% increase in passive 
representation is related to a .171 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos 
receiving OSS.  All of these effects are similar to the relationships found for Latino ISS 
rates and Black OSS rates.  Consequently the same explanation of stable districts 
enacting stricter policies that limit teachers’ discretion holds true. 
For the lowest value of teacher stability (25%), a 1% increase in Latino 
representation is related to a .012 percentage point increase in the percent of Latinos 
receiving OSS.  This is different than the relationships found for Latino ISS rates and 
Black OSS rates. One explanation for this is that within unstable districts Latino teachers 
use OSS instead of ISS as a way to stigmatize certain cultural behaviors.  Latino teachers 
know, either through their own personal experiences or those of their friends and family 
that Latinos who are not fluent in English are often discriminated against (Welch and 
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Foster 1987; Garcia-Bedolla 2009).  They then choose to use OSS as a way to stigmatize 
this behavior believing that this “tough love approach” will help students in the long run 
(Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342; see also Schneider and Ingram1997).  While this 
punishment is harsh, it is not necessarily as punitive as other tools like expulsions, and 
given the instability of the district, these teachers may be too overwhelmed with other 
responsibilities to use ISS which requires that a teacher sit in and watch students.  OSS 
will also send a clear message to other Latino students that the behavior is not tolerated. 
This would explain the difference in effects for Blacks and Latinos as Blacks, for the 
most part, are already fluent in English. However qualitative research will be needed 
before this hypothesis can be accepted.    
Expulsions 
Blacks  
 The marginal effects for stability and passive representation did not show any 
statistically significant regions28.  I hypothesize that this is due in part to the nature of 
this particular policy tool.  Even though teachers can make recommendations for the 
policy tool they believe should be used, an administrator must agree and authorize with 
their decision (Texas Education Code sec.37.009).  In addition, the more severe the 
punishment recommended, the greater the involvement of administrators and parents.  
Therefore with the recommendation for expulsions, the stability and demographic of the 
                                                 
28 At the mean value for personnel stability, a 1% increase in the percent of Black passive representation is 
correlated with a .5185 percentage point increase in the percent of Black students expelled. The mean 
value of passive representation demonstrates that a 1% increase in personnel stability is associated with a 
.104 percentage point increase in the percent of Blacks expelled. 
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teaching workforce does not have the same effect that they do for lesser forms of 
discipline since parents have the opportunity to appeal the decision and administrators 
must be able to justify the expulsion as the only suitable form of punishment (Texas 
Education Code sec.37.009).  Thus the use of the tool extends beyond a teacher’s sole 
discretion.  
Latinos 
 At the mean value of passive representation I find that a 1% increase in the 
percent personnel stability is related to a .4253 percentage point increase in the percent 
of Latino students expelled.  For the highest value of passive representation (70%), I find 
a .543 percentage point in the percent of Latinos expelled for every 1% increase in 
personnel stability.  Likewise at the lowest value (0%), I find a .403 percentage point 
increase in the percent of Latinos expelled for every 1% increase in personnel stability.  
Thus in this case stability increases the rate at which Latino students are expelled within 
both representative and unrepresentative school districts.  The previous argument posited 
for stable districts having a set rubric for disciplinary procedures also applies here. 
Teachers may be unable to exercise discretion in these districts even if the policies in 
place work to punish Latinos at higher rates than other students (perhaps as a way to 
stigmatize certain behaviors such as the use of Spanish).  
 There was not a significant relationship when the marginal effects of passive 
representation were examined29.  The previous explanation holds in that with the 
                                                 
29 At the mean value of teacher stability a 1% increase in the percent of Latino teachers is correlated with a 
.0104 percentage point increase in the percent of Latino students expelled. 
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recommendation for expulsions, the demographic of the teaching workforce does not 
have any effect given the nature of this policy tool.  Since the parents of students have 
the opportunity to appeal the decision and administrators must be able to justify the 
expulsion as the only suitable form of punishment, this tool may be beyond the reach of 
any teachers’ discretion (Texas Education Code sec.37.009). 
Conclusion 
 In the end I find further evidence of a substitution effect for the performance 
variables30.  While there is no interactive effect, the presence of one strategy can still 
lead to improved outcomes for Black and Latino students.  This is especially evident 
given that for Black students one strategy had the greatest effect on performance when 
the other strategy was at its lowest level.  The lack of effects for expulsions further 
support the idea that the nature of this tool is preventing passive representation and 
personnel stability from having a significant effect as it requires many more individuals 
to implement when it comes to Black students and Latino students in some 
organizations.  These effects also suggest that the difference between Black students 
punished and Latino students punished may be attributed to the difference in language 
between the two groups.  More research however is required.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 This is similar to the findings in the previous chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 This study attempted to examine the effects of two common public management 
strategies in order to determine how strategies like personnel stability and representative 
bureaucracy could be used to create better policy outcomes for minority students.  While 
in some cases this analysis has offered more questions than answers, it takes the critical 
first step needed to determine if and how current public management strategies interact 
with one another as well as how they affect outcomes for groups that historically have 
been disadvantaged (Selden 1997; Light 1999).  Thus this study should be used as a 
springboard for similar scholarship using other management strategies as well as 
examining the effect of personnel stability and representative bureaucracy within other 
public organizations.  Only through extensive study can we determine what unique 
combination of strategies work to accomplish the goal of creating equitable outcomes for 
all groups.  
 From these analyses some conclusions can be drawn.  First in terms of academic 
performance all districts, with the exception of those that are unstable and 
unrepresentative, failed to demonstrate an interactive relationship. These strategies did 
however show a substitution effect as one strategy can be used in place of the other in 
order to improve minority performance.  This is a beneficial finding as it can help 
managers who cannot pursue either personnel stability or passive representation improve 
the academic attainment by pursuing an alternative strategy.  While the two strategies 
did show this effect, they did not show a combined, interactive effect.  This leaves us 
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with the question of why?  The limits of this analysis do not allow me to make any hard 
conclusions, but rather offer another set of hypotheses.   
As mentioned in chapter two, perhaps these two strategies result in the 
acquisition of similar skill sets.  For example, imagine we have two teachers.  One is a 
minority teacher, the other a non-minority teacher.  Following along with the theory of 
representative bureaucracy, let us assume that this minority teacher is familiar with the 
minority-white achievement gap (Pitkin 1967; Meier 1993b; Selden 1997).  She is also 
familiar with the boisterous nature of some minority males, the vernacular used by this 
group, as well as other issues that plague this clientele such as poverty (Dee 2005; 
Gregory and Weinstein 2008).  If she is aware of these issues before she enters the 
organization, how can personnel stability improve her knowledge of this clientele?  
Other teachers who have been in the district longer then our minority teacher may be 
able to teach procedures and skills that ease her workload or allow her to communicate 
better with administrators, but what new knowledge can they give her about her racial 
group?  This is not to say that this teacher does not care to learn anything new about her 
clientele, but instead the facts she learns are too general enough to be applied to the 
whole group.  Stability instead, only give her the opportunity to offer additional support 
to students on an individual basis, which would not show up in an aggregated analysis.  
Thus despite our teachers efforts, there is no significant, interactive effect. 
Now let us discuss our non-minority teacher.  Once again we will assume that the 
theory of representative bureaucracy’s assumptions hold (Selden 1997).  This non-
minority teacher therefore should enter the organization with little or no knowledge of 
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the minority group’s special interests because she does not share the same life 
experiences or culture.  In fact, according to Dee (2005), she may even hold prejudice 
against the minority group and view them as troublesome, lazy, and unintelligent.  After 
a few years within the school district, her perception of these students can change.  She 
may hear stories about great academic achievement, generosity, and hard work from 
other teachers who have been in the district for years (Lipsky 1980; Dunn 1997; 
Kauffman 2002).  She herself could have positive experiences with minority students 
that challenge her previous prejudices about these students.  Instead of blaming these 
students for low performance, she would see the effect that poverty plays for this group 
as well as other factors.  All of this knowledge should make her more in tune to the 
difficulties that this minority clientele faces when it comes to education, which allows 
her to adjust her teaching style in ways that benefit this group.  Furthermore, as a part of 
the stable personnel, she would then be able to impart the general knowledge, skills, and 
procedures she has gained to other teachers with no experience with this clientele, which 
works to improve minority student performance (Lipsky 1980; Loeb et al 2005).    
Assuming that the assumptions of both personnel stability and representative 
bureaucracy hold, it is completely possible that our minority teacher and non-minority 
teacher have similar perceptions of minority students’ needs as well as a similar 
repertoire of skills to address these needs, which would explain the substitution effect 
found in this analysis.  If the organization is stable and representative, it is even quite 
possible that our minority teacher played a role in re-socializing our non-minority 
teacher and changing her initial perceptions of minority students (Meier and Nicholson-
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Crotty 2006).  This leads to the acquisition of a similar set of ideals and skills that while 
allowing these two strategies to be substitutes for each other and improve performance, 
would not have an interactive effect.  If the organization is unstable and representative, 
then one expects that minority teachers would come in with a set of ideas about their 
minority clientele due to shared life experiences and values (Selden 1997).  This allows 
them to improve minority student performance without the need for increased stability as 
personnel stability should not add any unique information about this clientele that would 
have a drastic effect on performance.  Finally in an unrepresentative and unstable 
organization there would be no one entering the organization with beneficial knowledge 
about this minority group as well no stable personnel to pass on information or skills, 
which results in a decrease in the academic performance of minority students (Lipsky 
1980; Selden 1997).  While this theory is all conjecture, it explains the findings in 
chapter two in a logical manner.  However, without a survey of teachers’ skills, 
perceptions, and teaching techniques this theory cannot be tested at this time.         
Just as much as stability could help non-minority teachers adjust their teaching 
styles to the needs of minority students, it can also hinder their ability to prevent the use 
of punitive policy tools against them.  For example, for expulsions I find that no 
districts, with the exception of unstable and unrepresentative districts, have a significant 
effect on the rates at which minority students are expelled.  Looking from the glass half 
full perspective, the upside is that these districts do not increase the usage of the most 
punitive policy tool teachers have.  However from the glass half empty perspective they 
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do not decrease its usage either.  This suggests that at least for expulsions, a different 
managerial strategy will be more successful in reducing these rates.   
When OSS rates were examined, only unstable and representative districts 
decreased the percent of minority students receiving OSS.  Unstable and 
unrepresentative districts increased the rates at which minorities received OSS.  These 
findings, when combined with the findings for expulsions, suggest that the amount of 
street-level bureaucratic discretion varies greatly between stable and unstable 
organizations.  As mentioned before, the use of these punitive policy tools require an 
administrator’s consent before the can be implemented.  A stable personnel will be well 
aware of the issues with parents, of claims of unequal treatment, and threats of lawsuits 
that come with these types of punishments (Skiba and Rausch 2006).  They, as a result, 
can create a rubric that clearly states the infractions that warrant these types of 
punishments (Skiba and Noam 2002; Skiba and Rausch 2006).  This implementation of 
stricter policies and more uniform disciplinary procedures effectively prevents stable 
and/or representative teachers from taking an advocate role and decreasing the rates at 
which minority students are punished. 
  Then why is there a difference between expulsions and OSS?  Expulsions are 
the most punitive policy tools.  In Texas they fall into two categories: expulsion out of 
the district and expulsion to a JJAEP (TEA.gov 2010).  In either case most students who 
are expelled have a record of multiple other offenses warranting previous punishments 
like removal from a school (in some rare cases), OSS, ISS, and detention.  Before they 
are expelled, the student and their parents have the chance to appeal the case and attempt 
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to plea bargain in a sense, for a lesser punishment (Texas Education Code. Sec.37.009).   
The administration of this tool therefore is a lengthy process, which involves not only 
the teacher, but also the vice principals, principals, and superintendent.  Knowing the 
heavy workloads that all of these individuals carry, as well as the limited financial and 
personnel resources each district has, it is quite possible that, unless the case is extreme, 
the district defaults to the second most punitive which is OSS.  If minority teachers are 
present within stable schools who have these policies outlined, it is probable that they 
use their limited discretion to advocate for the use of OSS as an alternative punishment 
to expulsion.  While this results in an increase in the amount of minorities receiving 
OSS, it keeps these students in the district and hopefully improve their chances of 
graduating (DeRidder 1991; Skiba and Peterson 1999; Roch et al 2010).  
Unstable and representative teachers can decrease the rates at which student 
receive OSS because they may not be tied to the same disciplinary structure as stable and 
representative teachers are.  While these schools have some zero-tolerance procedures in 
place, such as automatic expulsion if a weapon is brought to school or after a student’s 
third fight, teachers may not have the experience with the clientele necessary to create a 
rubric of disciplinary measures for every infraction.  These minority teachers, who 
should share knowledge of the overuse of discipline against minority students, use their 
discretion in order to choose less punitive measures such as lunch clean up or detention 
as a way to punish students (Meier et al 1989; Gregory and Weinstein 2008; Roch et al 
2010).  When we consider the added fears that these teachers have of these students 
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“running the streets” while in OSS, it is even more probable that they would seek to 
prevent any punishment that would leave students unsupervised (DeRidder 1991).  
Finally it appears that both stable and representative districts and unstable and 
representative districts decrease ISS rates for Latinos and for the range of some districts, 
Black ISS rates.  The fact that unrepresentative and stable districts have no significant 
effect suggests that passively representative teachers are actually be able to use some 
discretion for the use of the policy tool.  ISS is one of the least punitive tools that 
teachers can use, and in the dataset, the most commonly used.  Given the rates it is used, 
it is possible that vice principals and principals rely more on the teacher’s discretion for 
the use of ISS, as it gives them time to focus on more serious cases and issues.  If this is 
the case, then minority teachers can use this limited discretion in order to reduce the 
percent of minority students who receive ISS. 
Then why do Black teachers not have the same consistent effect? They should 
have the same discretion when it comes to this policy tool, right?  While Black teachers 
are be given the same discretion, they may not have as many times to exercise it as 
Latino teachers do in every stable district.  For example, if the infraction is language 
based or involves a student that speaks primarily Spanish, a Latino teacher may be asked 
to intervene and translate on behalf of a teacher or administrator.  This gives them the 
opportunity to advocate on behalf of the student in ways and in all stable districts that 
Black teachers are not able to.  However before these tentative conclusions can become 
policy recommendations, extensive qualitative research is required. 
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Given the structure of this dissertation as well as the lack of interactive 
relationships, there is the expectation of certain criticisms which must be addressed.  
First and foremost the criticism is why the combination of strategies improves outcomes 
and mitigates the negative effects for some groups in some instances, but not for others.  
More specifically, scholars will ask why do stable/unstable and 
representative/unrepresentative street-level bureaucrats (in this study teachers) act the 
way they do?  These questions are after all critical if we seek to make strategy 
recommendations or policy outcome predictions for public organizations.  It is apparent 
that this study, being solely quantitative, cannot fully answer these questions, but it does 
give the discipline a step in the right direction.  It allows us to see that there are in some 
cases similar interactive relationships between personnel stability and representation as 
well as similar substitution effects for Black and Latino clients.  While the rest of these 
findings run counter to the hypotheses, they suggest that whatever phenomenon is 
occurring works similarly for these two groups.  Thus it gives us an idea of what policy 
outcomes to expect with the use of certain strategy combinations as well as helps 
structure the questions need for the next step: qualitative research.  Without this initial 
analysis there is a chance scholars have missed an opportunity to engage in qualitative, 
as well as additional quantitative, research in a policy area that has a significant and long 
lasting effect on American society.  This study therefore has the potential to provide a 
greater understanding as to how public management strategies can be used to improve 
the policy outcomes for minority groups so that they are equitable to the outcomes of 
Anglo clients.  
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The second major criticism expected is how is this study “new” given that these 
strategies have been used by public managers and studied by scholars for decades?  This 
study is not an attempt at the creation of new theory, but an attempt to better understand 
the theories we currently have.  There is no consensus on the effects of personnel 
stability or representative bureaucracy on minority clients (Selden 1997; Light 1999; 
O’Toole and Meier 2003; Lim 2006; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006).  Scholars 
therefore continue to examine these management strategies in hopes of being able to fine 
tune these theories so that predictions can be made.  This analysis stems from the same 
goal.  Knowing exactly how representation affects minorities is a noble goal and is 
extremely beneficial to the discipline.  However, rarely is representation the only theory 
at work.  This is especially true within public organizations as street-level bureaucrats 
bring a host of characteristics, experiences, and beliefs with them.  Knowing the 
assumption that all bureaucrats will adopt the culture and views of the organization and 
that representative bureaucracy is based on the assumption that individuals keep these 
unique traits, it is especially necessary to examine how a strategy like personnel stability 
interacts with representative bureaucracy and influences policy outcomes (Mosher 1982; 
Selden 1997).  Thus while this study is not “new” it is needed in order to better 
understand how both of these management strategies can work as substitutes for one 
another in some cases and as interactive in others. 
The next step is obvious.  Qualitative research is needed in order to fully 
understand these findings.  We must know why street-level bureaucrats act in certain 
ways.  We must know what constrains their behavior as well what encourages them to 
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use their discretion.  We must understand if street-level bureaucrats are actually using 
different techniques and skills based on their work and life experiences, or if the 
difference in outcome is based more on the client and their perception and interaction 
with these bureaucrats.  In the end we must have a greater understanding of the 
individuals within the organization before we can understand the effects that the 
organization has on policy outcomes. 
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APPENDIX A 
NON-INTERACTIVE MODELS 
The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Black 
Performance: Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variable 
Coefficient (Robust 
Standard Error) 
Teacher Stability 
.042* 
(.020) 
Passive Representation 
.090* 
(.024) 
Lagged Black TAKS Pass Rate 
.491* 
(.014) 
White TAKS Pass Rate 
.429* 
(.023) 
Enrollment (Logged) 
.290 
(.160) 
Class Size 
.001 
(.080) 
Percent State Aid 
.025* 
(.008) 
Percent Latino Students 
-.015 
(.011) 
Percent Low Income 
-.014 
(.014) 
Percent Black Students 
-.120* 
(.021) 
Teachers with less than 5 years 
experience 
.041  
(.014) 
Constant 
-3.40* 
(3.09) 
N= 10608   
R²= .735   
* if p < .05   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Latino 
Performance: Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variable   Coefficient (Robust 
Standard Errors) 
    
Teacher Stability .026* 
 (.012) 
Latino Representation .067* 
 (.008) 
Lagged Latino TAKS Pass Rate .458* 
 (.012) 
White TAKS Pass Rate .433* 
 (.015) 
Enrollment (logged) -.248* 
 (.101) 
Class size 0.055 
 (.054) 
State Aid 5.06E-09 
 (2.80E-09) 
Percent Low Income Students 0.002 
 (.009) 
Percent Black Students -.032* 
 (.01) 
Percent Latino students -.085* 
 (.008) 
Teachers with Less than 5 years of 
Experience 
-0.0008 
 (-.009) 
Constant -24.03* 
 (1.49) 
  
N= 15914   
R²= .760  
* if p<.05   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Black Expulsions: 
Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient  
(Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation .123 
 (.136) 
Teacher Stability .128  
(.216) 
Percent of Anglos Expelled -.443*  
(.069) 
Percent of Black Students .511*  
(.140) 
Percent of Latino Students -.754* 
 (.105) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
.350* 
 (.094) 
Enrollment (logged) -2.32* 
 (.929) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.001 
 (.002) 
Teacher Experience -.500 
 (.703) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.176* 
 (.075) 
Constant 69.96*  
(17.25) 
    
N= 471   
R²= .752   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Latino 
Expulsions: Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient  
(Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation .222  
(.156) 
Teacher Stability .512* 
 (.145) 
Percent of Anglos Expelled -.523* 
 (.059) 
Percent of Black Students -.890* 
 (.128) 
Percent of Latino Students .578*  
(.094) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
-.102  
(.078) 
Enrollment (logged) -2.95* 
 (.699) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
-.002 
 (.002) 
Teacher Experience -.481 
 (.524) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.049 
 (.082) 
Constant 98.41* 
 (10.50) 
    
N= 623   
R²= .767   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Black OSS Rates: 
Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation -.219* 
 (.069) 
Teacher Stability .051 
 (.046) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving 
OSS 
-.411* 
 (.034) 
Percent of Black Students .935* 
 (.083) 
Percent of Latino Students -.519* 
 (.045) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
.116* 
 (.034) 
Enrollment (logged) .239 
 (.360) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0003 
 (.0006) 
Teacher Experience .132  
(.164) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.003 
 (.053) 
Constant 45.82* 
 (5.73) 
    
N= 3735   
R²= .784   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Latino OSS Rates: 
Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation .288 
 (.059) 
Teacher Stability .011 
 (.039) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving 
OSS 
-.297* 
 (.029) 
Percent of Black Students -.586* 
 (.065) 
Percent of Latino Students .782* 
 (.037) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
-.143* 
 (.025) 
Enrollment (logged) -.421 
 (.277) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0006 
 (.0004) 
Teacher Experience .490* 
 (.135) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
.491 
 (.135) 
Constant 35.40* 
 (4.70) 
    
N= 4124   
R²= .863   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
 
 
 147 
 
 
The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Black ISS Rates: 
Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation -.210* 
 (.064) 
Teacher Stability .022 
 (.032) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving 
ISS 
-.196* 
 (.029) 
Percent of Black Students 1.29* 
 (.065) 
Percent of Latino Students -.218* 
 (.036) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
-.002 
 (.021) 
Enrollment (logged) .792* 
 (.223) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0004 
 (.0003) 
Teacher Experience -.156 
 (.116) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.047 
 (.038) 
Constant 17.96* 
 (4.24) 
    
N= 5768   
R²= .865   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
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The Effects of Representative Bureaucracy and Personnel Stability on Latino ISS Rates: 
Non-Interactive Model 
Independent Variables 
Coefficient 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
    
Passive Representation -.034  
(.042) 
Teacher Stability .019 
 (.024) 
Percent of Anglos Receiving 
ISS 
-.347* 
 (.029) 
Percent of Black Students -.558* 
 (.050) 
Percent of Latino Students .755* 
 (.035) 
Percent of Low Income 
Students 
-.105* 
 (.016) 
Enrollment (logged) .295 
 (.207) 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
.0003† 
 (.0002) 
Teacher Experience .141† 
 (.084) 
Percent of Teachers without a 
Permit 
-.043† 
 (.024) 
Constant 35.96 
 (4.22) 
    
N= 7098   
R²= .923   
* if p <.05   
† if p <.10   
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTIVE STATSTICS  
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Latino TAKS Pass Rate 18349 60.878 18.981 0 100 
Black TAKS Pass Rate 12499 54.45 20.5 0 100 
Latino Passive Representation 20251 11.152 20.594 0 100 
Black Passive Representation 19868 6.259 15.14 0 100 
Teacher Stability 19289 81.702 12.432 0 100 
Lagged Latino TAKS rate 18348 60.885 18.974 0 100 
White TAKS Pass Rate 19314 76.419 14.699 0 100 
Logged Enrollment 20417 6.826 1.517 1.791 12.263 
Class Size 20399 13.040 3.289 1 84.333 
State Aid 19898 5659665 2.21e+07 0 5.88e+08 
Percent Latino Students 20417 30.609 27.724 0 100 
Percent Low Income Students 20403 50.615 20.606 0 100 
Percent Black Students 20417 10.088 16.280 0 100 
Percent Teachers with less 
than 5 years experience 
20426 32.339 15.354 0 100 
Black Expulsions 738 42.927 24.614 4.545 100 
Latino Expulsions 1221 61.58 26.422 8.235 100 
White Expulsions 1142 53.019 23.464 1.531 100 
Black ISS Rates 6240 22.882 21.822 .073 100 
Latinos ISS Rates 9135 37.7 28.501 .433 100 
White ISS Rates 7973 55.275 29.036 .156 100 
Black OSS Rates 4390 36.234 25.593 .101 100 
Latino OSS Rates 5265 45.786 29.191 .763 100 
White OSS Rates 6572 52.586 29.419 .189 100 
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Magnitude of Effects Tables 
 Effects of Personnel Stability at Different Levels 
of Passive Representation: 
     
 TAKS ISS OSS Expulsions 
Minimum Observed 0.059 - 0.103 - 
Mean 0.0537 - 0.04 - 
Maximum Observed 0.05 - 0.335 - 
Black Students 
 
 Effects of Passive Representation at Different 
Levels of Personnel Stability: 
     
 TAKS ISS OSS Expulsions 
Minimum Observed 0.164 -0.07 -.106 - 
Mean 0.107 -0.0266 0.1608 - 
Maximum Observed 0.101 -0.0266 0.15 - 
Black Students 
 
 Effects of Personnel Stability at Different Levels 
of Passive Representation: 
     
 TAKS ISS OSS Expulsions 
Minimum Observed 0.023 - 0.1494 0.403 
Mean 0.0222 - 0.0275 0.4253 
Maximum Observed 0.101 - 0.2244 0.543 
Latino Students 
 
 Effects of Passive Representation at Different 
Levels of Personnel Stability: 
     
 TAKS ISS OSS Expulsions 
Minimum Observed 0.084 -0.039 0.012 - 
Mean 0.1107 0.0644 0.1821 - 
Maximum Observed 0.119 0.081 0.171 - 
Latino Students 
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Data Distribution Graphs 
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